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PREFACE 
The following thesis is the product of O'~'Jer two years 
of research and \v!'i tingo. In preparing a. thesis on the 
proposed international ocean regime one particularly frus-
trating problem is encountered. There 1.s a. lack of a.ny 
comprehensive work of respectable quality on the topic. Only 
a small number of short articles of good quality that offer a 
thoughtful analysis of the subject ure ttvaila.ble. As a 
result, an extensive amount of original research was required 
to prepare this thesis. 
It is difficult, 1.f not improper, to na.n1e any 
individual as an ex.pert on q1e ocean regi.me is sue e The topic 
cuts across many different disciplines and has no single 
leading student. There are, however, some 01.1.tstMding 
individuals in areas related to the ocean regime issue • 
. M·altese Ambassador to the United Nations Arvid Pardo, must 
be recognized for his foresight :i.n focusing the world's 
,.attention on the need for an ocean reg:t.me. In 1967, the 
Ambassador from Malta, introduced to the United Nations 
General Assembly a resolution which called for, j.nt.~r .. ~;ill' a 
recognition of the sea-bed as the ttcommon heritage of me.n-
kind.n It was also Pardo's initiative that helped to 
establish the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee. 
For information on actual and potential ocean 
resources Jor.l!l L. Mero is the authoritative source. Although 
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Mere's original works are now somewhat dated, they continue 
to be the best available. (Consult the Bibliography for 
pertinent materials.) For an introspective political 
iv 
analysis of the problems presented by an ocean regime Ann 
Hollick and Evan Laurd, who both have articles in the Hinter 
1972-73 issue of Foreign Poj.ic_x, give a realistic view which 
was very helpful in formulating some of the 1.deas that follow. 
Seyom Brown and Larry Fabian, in the January, 197it. lssue of 
Fore!gn Af.:f.air;!, have outlined the major issues to be faced 
at this year 1s Conference on the Law of the Sea to be held :tn 
Caracas, Venezuela. 
The efforts of Elisabeth Mann Borgese should also be 
noted. On<3 of the most prolific authors on the regime topic, 
Dr .. Borgese he.s helped to b:d,ng about construct:i.ve dialogue 
on the regime issue at an international level. \'lorking with 
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions Dr. 
Borgese assisted in making the 1970 Pacem in Mar·ibus 
Convocation possible. The Convocation was held in Malta and 
assembled 260 political leaders, industrialists, scientists 
and fishery experts in an attempt to atimulate political 
action. One·outcome of the Convocation is a collection of 
articles by various authorities on topics related to the 
regime. The book, Pacem in ~1aribus, is edited by Borgese and 
was very helpful in several different areas related to this 
thesis. 
It should be noted, however, that all the sources. 
which are mentioned above, while excellent in their purpose, 
are too brief to provide a comprehensive ane.lysls of the 
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regime issue. Such a.n analysis is, to my knowledge, yet to 
be·published. The' bulk of information and understanding of 
the regime issue is to be found in United Nation's documents, 
resolutions, Secretariat studies and draft proposals 
submitted by member states. 
The subject area of this thesis is the proposed 
international sea regime. The regime in this context refers 
to the pr•oposed international organization to control the 
resources of the sea-bed beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.. Regime in the above context ha.s a specific 
meaning and should not be confused with the more general 
·meaning of a regime of the sea. In the more general sense R 
regime of the sea would encompass the entire la1-1 of the sea .. 
Such a broad scope is n,ot intended, therefore no treatment of 
.,,. fishing rights, limitation of' nu.clear" a:rms, extensive oil 
deposits et cetera are attempted except as they specifically 
relate to the proposed ocean regime and its jurisdiction. 
Special thanks must be extended to sevel"al groups for 
. the kind assistance they rendered to me. In pru:•ticular I 
wish to express my gratitude to the General Commj_ttee of the 
XXIII Session of the Model Unl ted Nat ions of the Far lvest for 
their invaluable contributions. Parts of this thesis reflect 
some of the work of the General Comrr1ittee. The library 
staffs at Stanford University and the University of 
California at Santa Barbara have earned my appreciation and 
thanks for their skillf,ul assistance. The UCSB library 
contains one of the best collection of materials on ocea."l-
related topics in the world. Likewise, the United Nations 
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depository at Stanford Uni.versity was an indispensible aid. 
In addition, the library at the University of the Pacific 
also offered every assistance possible despite limited 
resource materials on the regime topic. 
vi 
[ 
---
---
~------- -----
t:: 
"--'--~"·---
-------
TABLE OF CON'I'EN'I'S 
CHAPTER I; 
I. INTRonucrrioN • . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 
PART I: ENVIRONMENT AND BACKGROUND •• .. . . 
II. THE HIS'I'ORICAL MOVEMENT TOWARD ESTABLISHING 
III. 
IV. 
v. 
VI. 
VII. 
VIII. 
A NEvi OCEAN REGIME 
OCEAN RESOURCES •• 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 
PART II: POLITICS . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . 
A POLITICAL THEORY FOR THE OCEANS. • . . . 
IN'l'ERNATI ONAL POLITI CAL CONFLICTS. • ~ • • 9 • • 
PART III: OHGANIZATIONAL PA'I'TERNS FOH AN 
OCEAN REGIME. • . . . . • • . . . 
POSSIBLE STRUCTURES FOR AN OCEAN REGIME. • .fl • • 
PUNC'I'IONS Al\fD POWERS OF 'l'HE REGIME • . . . . . . 
• • • . . • • • • • • • . . . • • • • 
APPENDIX •.•. ~ . . .. . . . . • • • • . . . • • • • e • • 
BIBLI OGHAPKi. • t • • • • • • • 4 • • • 4 • • 4 • • • .IJ 
PAGE ,.....;---------t__: 
....... ~~-----
1 
6 
7 
21 
------
66 
67 
---
80 
93 -,_, 
-
106 
111 
---
~--
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
For centuries nations of the world have used the 
oceans in a dual, nearly paradoxical way •... The seas have 
tied nations together providing a media for communi.cation, 
transit, and trade. Conversely, the oceans. have also served 
as a buffer between continents and nations. Thus, the 
oceans have brought nations together while also keeping them 
apart. Currently,.rapid technological developments threaten 
to convert the oceans into .. a, battleground as nations grapple 
for tho living and non-living resources of the ocean depths. 
The problem of establishing a regime to contx•ol the 
resources ·O.f the sea. is not unlike other in ternat:i.onal con-
cerns in the. general sense. Thls problem c.ontains two dynamic 
conflicts; fix•st is the struggle betl"leen man and his environ-
ment~ and second, is the struggle.among nations and among 
men. Too often when man seems clpse to harmonizing with his 
environment the clash between nations disrupts that harmony. 
Currently, progress toward institutingan international 
regime to dis·~ri bute ocean resources has been becalmed by 
the stalemate of counterbalBl"lcing national interests. 
The resources of the sea comprise a vast reservolr 
of 111ealth hez•etofore unreachable due to the lack of necessary 
technology., In mineral weal"l.;h alone (to say nothing of the 
vast off ... shotte pet1~o1eum z•ese:r•ves), the sea. offers an . 
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impressive list of resources. Manganese nodules contain 
enough copper, manganese, nickel, and cobalt to satisfy. the 
world's need at current levels for thousands of years. The 
technological .capacity to exploit these-resources is rapidly 
developing •. The danger lies in an ocean ttgold rush" among 
developed nations to secure this wealth. Such a race could 
easily escalate into international conflicts, even war. In 
addition, ocean resources, suddenly reachable due to a 
technological breakthrough, would flood existing wo1~ld 
markets, depressing prices-of leading minerals by.as much as 
50 percent. For many developing countries, such as those 
whose gross national product (G.N~P.) depends heavily on 
land-based mineral exploitation, uncontrolled ocean mineral 
production would spell.economic. disaster&· Such a situation 
could only serve-to widen the existing gap between rich and 
poor nations of the world.. The developing countries do not 
have, and are unlikely to develop, the necessary technology 
to exploit non-living ocean resources. 
To avoid possible escalation of conflicts over sea ' 
resources and to prevent the expansion of the gap between 
rich and poor nations, an ocean regime is clearly needed in 
the interests of world peace and stability. However, such 
long-term values have relatively little affect on nations 
2 
who have vital, short-term economic stakes in ocean reserves. 
The developed and the developing, the coastal and the non-
coastal nations of the world, all want to maximlze their 
share of available maritime wealth. As a result the conflicts 
of interest have created the current stalemate. 
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As already mentioned, this situation is an example of' 
the intersecting struggles betvJeen man and environment, and 
the conflicts among nations. In this regard the pattern is 
similar to other problems in international relations. But 
in another sense it is altogether tmique. Never before has 
there been an international organization designed to allocate 
ocean resources. Consider the significance of an interna-
tional body regulating the flow of resources to nations who 
may depend upon those raw materials for economic survlval or 
who may demand ocean reserves to aver•t a potential energy 
crisis. In light of this extensive responslbility, it seems 
premature to express optimism about a rapid agreement by 
nations on a meaningful regime of extensive powers. It would 
also seem futile to look for operational models for ~n ocean 
regime among existlng international functional agencies. If 
and when a regime is established, it will require a structure 
that can maintain the flexibility to adjt1st to rapidly 
changing political realitieso 
Finally then, we must ask where the solution is to be 
found. How, in light of confllcting short-term national 
interests can the long-term inte:r•e·st of world stability and 
peace be served~ The solution, it is the author's thesis, 
will rest upon a political compromise of short-term intel .. ests 
to accz·ue the advantage of the long-term need for peace and 
stability. In short, in order to maintain peace for ourselves 
and for posterity, we are required to somehow align, through 
tradeoffs and compromise, short-term interests with long-term 
goals. The ptu•pose and theme of this paper is to analyze the 
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various means of achieving this alignment. To accomplish 
this end, a thorough analysis of the sea-bed ,controversy is 
required. The intent. is to gain some insight into the issues 
in thehope that a better understanding of thfe problem will 
aid in the effort toward its solution. In pursuit of this 
goal the following organizational approach is taken. Part I, 
"Environment and Background," studies the con:text in which 
the sea-bed issue exists and the historical r.oots fi•om ;.1hich 
it sprang. Chapter II covers the relevant hi:storica.l develop·· 
ments which bear on the subject. Chapter III 11 11 0cean 
Resources, n is vital to a:n understanding of the proposal to 
establish an ocean regime •. · This. chapter di~cusses the extent 
a.nd availability of ocean-wealth ...... who stands to gain, who 
to lose from a sea regime. 
Part II, nPolitics," is an inquiry :tnto the political 
aspects of the .ocean r.egime dilemma. This section attempts 
to study both theoretical and practical approaches surrounding 
the sea-bed crisis •.. Chapter IV examines some differing · 
theoretical viewpoints on the sea regime conflict. Chapter 
V of this section elaborates on the specific international 
conflicts related to the sea-bed issue. 
The final section, Part III, focuses on specific 
proposals for the sea regime. It presents a critical 
analysis of several key draft stat_utes. In making this 
examination the chapters of this- section are divi.ded along a 
structural-functional pattern. Chapter VI discusses various 
structural suggestions for the regime. Chapter VII deals 
with the possible functions and powers that the regime might 
~ 
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exercise. 
Before· plunging into the text that follows, it may be 
instructive, in light of the alignrnent.sought between short-
term interests and long-term goals, to ponder a pertinent 
statement by an adroit politician of the past: 
Few can be induced to labor. exclusively for 
posterity; and none will do it enthusiastically. 
Posterlty has· done nothing for us; and theorize on 
as we may, practically we shall do very little for it, 
unless we are made to think t-le 1are at the se.rne ti.me doing something for ourselves. 
Abraham Lincoln 
l u. s. President (Nixon), "Offshore·Minera.l 
Resources:. A Challenge and· an Opportunity," Ex~ 
of the President .( 1969), p ... 1. This repo1•t cites a quotation 
of Fresfdent Abi?aham Lincoln. 
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CHAPTER II 
TliE HISTORICAL MOVEMENT TO\vARD ESTABLISHING 
A NEW OCEAN REGIME 
I 
The primary objective of Chapter II is to outline the 
significant event,s that have led to the· present proposals for 
an international ocean regime. It is also hoped that this 
historical information will help to provide some insight into 
the i-ntricate international problems currently obstructing 
the establishment of a mean.ingful sea-bed authority. 
This section is organized chronologically beginning 
l'Jith. the T~ume.n Proclamation of 19!t.5, continuing through 
. discu.ssions of the 1958 and 1960 United Nations Conferences 
on the I.aw of the Sea$ and finally analyzing related events 
and resolu.tions in past United Nations General Assernbly 
sessions from 1967 (22nd Session} to the present. 
The source of the modern problem of possession of the 
continental.shelf can be directly traced to the Truman 
. 1 
Proclamation of 28 September 1945. By asserting national 
sovereignty over the continental shelf adjacent to the United 
States, Truman ushered in a new era and created considerable 
concern for the adequacy of the traditional law of the sea. 
1 u. s. President (Truman), nPolicy of the United 
States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil 
and Sea Bod of the Continental Shelf," Proclamation· 2667, 
~dera~-~~!st~r-~ (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1945}; p. 1230J. 
7 
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The fact that the .first agenda of the Intel'national 
Law Commission (1949) included the regime of the high seas 
and the regime of the territorial sea, among topics which it 
considered. both necessary and feasible, shows this concern. 
8, 
Throughout the next five years the Commission prepared 
articles on its stated topics. At the request of the General 
Assembly the Commission, in 1954, began to collect the 
articles which it had adopted concernlng the hi.gh seas, the 
tel .. ritoria.l sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, 
and the conservation of the living resources of the sea. 
The report of the Com111ission was presented dw:•ing the 
11th Session (1956) of the General Assembly. It contained 
seventy-three draft. ar-ticles covering the territorial sea; 
the high seas,. fishing,_ the contiguous zone, and the continen-
tal shelf .... The meticulous work of. the commission was not in 
vain for on February 21, 1957 the General Assembly decided to 
convene an international conference to examine the law of the 
sea, taking account not only of the legal, but also the techc• 
nical, biological, economic., and poll tical aspects of the 
problem. The results of the Conference were to be embodied 
in ono or more international conventions. 
~feren~ 
In 1958, the first United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea met in Geneva, Switzerland from February 24 to 
April 27. Eighty-six states were represented, one of the 
larges.t group of sovereign· states which had ever gathered for 
·any purpose up to that t:tme. The Conference divided its work 
- --- -
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into five main committees;· the,'l'erritorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, the High Seas and the General Regime, the 
High Seas Fishing and Conservation of Living Resou.rces 1 the 
Continental Shelf, and the Question of Free Access to the Sea 
of Land-locked States. 
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
I 
was successful in that it adopted four international conven-
tions of major importance to the law of nations. However, the 
Conference .failed to provide the lnternational community with 
a precise definition of the continental shelf, a failure that 
the·com.munity has had to live·with ever.since. The definiti.on 
of.fered by the Conference lies .. in Article 1 of the "Convention 
on the Continental Shelf.u This article .defines the limits of 
national jurisdiction. over the sea-bed ··largely on the basis of 
exploitability.2 Thus, limits under the nconvention on the 
Continental Shelf" are expandable as technological capabili-
ties improve. 
From the United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, the statement on the Law of the Continental Shelf as 
outlined in Article 1 was extremely vague. It has been inter-
preted to mean that coastal states may exploi.t the ocean to 
any depth which is technologically possible. Of course, 1.n 
exploring thi.s possibility a little further, it is not hard 
to see that as science develops, this could give a few 
technologically advanced nations.virtually unlimited access 
to the ocean bottom. Coastal states could. simply extend 
2u.N. Document.A/Conf. l3/L.55 (1958), P• 1. 
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10 
'their sovereign jurisdiction out as far as the technology 
permitted. Advanced states could unilaterally claim huge 
portions of the sea-bed and this development could set off a 
major rush to claim the existing ocean bottom. This rush 
would encompass all-the major powers and could quite possibly 
produce conflicts leading to a.world waro · This eventuality 
arises out of a possibility that states r1ould begin to claim 
sovereignty over the sea or the air abov~ the shelf and 
impose restrictions -upon navigational freedom. 
Article 2, paragraph 4, relates to the addition of 
materials which includes- "living-organisms belonging to 
sedentary species .. '~ -~1hls. is interpreted to include oysters 
and cra.bs ·"but no shrimp." Further, analysis reveals that· in 
the case-·of. the boundary disputes between states on coasts 
facing each other, the issue was to be settled by agreement 
or, in the absence of agreement, the- principle of equidistance 
from the coa.st-l.ine/bay-llnes was to be applied. (Further 
discussion in this area, i.e., historic bays and straits, was 
disseminated by the International Law Commlssion, and \'rill be 
discussed later). 
The conventions on Fishing and Conservation, and the 
High Seas have proven to be less controversial. This is 
primarily true because these were attempts to codify inter-
national customs of long standing. While the first Conference 
could be called a success because it dealt positively with 
many issues, it neglected to deal with two controversial 
issues which were the.major reasons for convening the 1960 
conference. 
\----'------------
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Because of the admitted short comings of the first 
Geneva Conference a second conference was called by the 
General Assembly on December 10, 19;)8. The Conference was 
convened at Geneva between March 16 and J~pril 27, 1960. 
Eighty-two nations attended the Conference, but the delegates 
• I 
returned home 1-1i thout signing a single doctunent of importance. 
The Conference failed to solve the problems around which it 
was called; namely, the breadth of the territorial sea bor-
dering each coastal state and the establishment of fishing 
zones by coastal states in the high seas.contiguous to, but 
beyond, the outer limit of the territorial seas of coastal 
states. 
The factors which contributed tothe controversy ln 
this convention were mainly regi.onal; although there was 
even some split among the regional blocs. Fox• instance, the 
NATO countries, as. a whole, supported a narrow territorial 
sea. Japan supported this because it wanted to be able to 
fish everywhere. Iceland- did not support this because it 
. wanted sole ju.risdiction over its· broad continental shelf in 
order to protect its fishing industry. The Communist Bloc 
supported a broad limit for the territorial sea.3 The Arab 
countries were united on a 12-mile territorial sea, because 
they felt this would aid them in their attempts to block 
Israel from the Gulf of Aqaba. Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Costa 
3Patrick A. Hulloy, "Political Storm Signals Over the 
Sea,tt li§.tux•al"HJ.story, LXXXII (December•, 1973), P• 87. 
..-. ---------
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Ric-a, the Philippines, and Indonesia supported a 200 mile 
l.imi t of the ter:t•i toria.l sea for fishing purposes. The land-
locked countries of Afganista.n and Bolivia, in particular, 
4 
supported freedom of access to the sea •.. The significance of 
this 11 do nothing" confe1•ence is that it served to keep the 
problem of the sea regime before an international forum. 
United Nat~~-lnvol~~ment Since 1960 
In August 1967, Ambassador Arvid Pardo from Malta 
proposed the-following item. for inclusion on the agenda of 
the General Assembly of the United Nat ions: 
Decl£ration and treaty concerning the reservation 
exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and 
of the ocean floor, underlying the seas beyond the 
limits of pl'esent national jurisdiction, and th~ use 
of their pesources in the interests of mankinq. · 
' -Mr. Pardo also introduced a draft resolution which called for 
the exclusion of the sea-bed and the ocean flooi• '1beyond the 
limits of present national.jurisdiction 11 from national 
appropriation, and the establishment of an international 
agency to regulate, supervise, and control all ocean bed 
activitieD beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This 
· agenda :1. tem was referred to the General Assembly's First 
Committee for further consideration. 
The developing states, with few citizens having tech-
nical training, were reluctant to take part in the debate, 
4Lewis M. Alexander, (ed.), Law of the Sea Offshore 
~llndaries and Zones (Ohio: Ohio University Press, -i967), p. 28. 
5 . Norrna.n "T. Padelford, ( ed.), fu~.Po~~P:t fQ~ 
Seas (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute oi' 'fechnolagy Press, 
19''tf), P• 23. 
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13 
while the great powers were unprepared to consider this agenda 
item at this time. In debating the Maltese proposal in the 
First Committee, the SQY.i_~'!; representative pointed out that a 
gr~at deaL_Qf preparatory work was needed to. identify and thel'). 
to agree ui>':m the most appropriate w~a.Y.f3 of studying the matte~~---·· 
The representative from the U~J:t!.t:l.c! ~~.l:l~es stated that a 11 h_~-~tY 
apppoach would inc;l,eed be impr11dent, when all deliberate speed, 
6 
not indefinite delay is call~4 for." 
·- .-·········. "•" ........ -· --· .. --· .... 
Primarily due to Mra Pardo's instigation, the Genex'al 
Assembly approved Resolution 2340 (XXII) on December 18, 1967. 
The resolution stressed the importance of preserving the sea-
bed and ocean,floor, and the subsoil thereof, from action and 
uses.l-lhich might be detrimental to the common interest of.man-
kind. The resolution a1so stated the.t the explora.tlon and use 
of thls al~ea should be conducted in accordance \~ith the 
purposes and principles-of the Charter in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and ~ecurity and for the 
benefit of all mankind. 7 Of even greater importance was the 
provision setti.ng up the !_d H'-!<? Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction. The purpose of the committee was to study the 
scope w1d various aspects of the Maltese declaration and 
report to the General Assembly during the 23rd Session in 1968. 
6 
"Draft U.N. Convention on the International Sea-Bed 
Area: u.s. Working Paper Submitted to U.N. Sea-Bed Committee," 
Th~-~:g_a_rtment of State2!±_1leti!!, LXT.II (August 24, 1970), 
p. 209. 
1 Padelford, p. 290. 
----
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At the 23rd Session, the General Assembly adopted two 
resolutions. The first, Resolution 2467A (XXIII), created a 
permanent 42 member Committee for the Peaceful Uses of the 
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the limits of National 
Jurisdiction. This committee was to consider the various 
aspects of the problem centered around two main subjects: 
_ Legal principles 'governing the use of the international seaa 
bed area which are to form the basis of an international 
regime; and future machinery to regulate the exploitation of 
sea-bed-resources. The second, Resolution 24670, (XXIII), 
requested the Secretary-General to study the establishment of 
international machinery to exploit -the resources of the area. 
The fii•st resolution passed \vith. a vote of 112 in 
favor, none agalnst, and seven abstentionso-· Those abstaining 
were Belol~ussian SSR, Cambodia, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, 
Hungary, Ukl .. anian SSR, and- the USSR. They abstained on the 
grounds that the permanent committee did not contain an 
adequate representation of the Socialist countries, and that 
the dl ... aft should have included the continental shelf' within 
the limits of the area to be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. The representative from the USSR stated tha.t this 
should have been included to prevent the military use of the 
sea-bed and the ocean floor. 8 
The second resolution concerning the study of inter-
national machinery passed with a vote of 85 in favor, nine 
against, and 25 abstentionso . The vote clearly defined the 
8 ~.N. Monthly ,Chronicle, VII (January, 1970), P• 73. 
--~ .; B- -
split between the developing states and the developed states. 
Th~ ~_E)'\T~_~oping states V()ted in favor, Hhile the developed 
states voted against, or abstained. The Socialist countries 
voted against this resolution because they feared that the 
creation of such international machinery would only serve the 
•· interests of "capitalist, impel"'ialist monopolies." The 
I 
Western bloc f'elt that it was too eaply to be considering such 
' ' 9 
a creation, so they abstained. 
The permanent Sea-Bed Committee reported on its work 
··during the 2J-tth Session of the General Assembly. · Resolution 
2574A (XXIV) stated the common belief that there exists an 
area of the sea-bed and ocean-floor which lies beyond the 
limits -of national jurisdi.ction (recognition of which is 
imperative if th,~re is to be an international regime); that 
this area should be used solely for peaceful purposes and its 
resources utllized for the benefit of all mankind; fu~d most 
importantly, that the area i~1 question could not be appro ... 
pr~ated by any nation.. The resolution also called on the 
Secretary-General to collect the opinions of members on the-
establishment of an international regime and what shape it 
should take. The resolution passed with 100 votes in favor, 
none against, and 11 abstentions. Within one year the Soviet 
Bloc had become convinced of the importance of this work. 
Perhaps of even more importance, though, was 25740. 
This 1•esolution: 
Declares that, pending the establishment of the 
aforementioned regllne: 
9-
U.No Monthly Ch~ggicle, P• 73. 
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a. States and persons, physical or juridicial, 
are bound to refrain from all acti vi. ties of exploi ta-
t ion of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and 
ocean floor, and the sttbsoil thereof, beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction; 
b. No clain1 to any part olO that area or its 
resources shall be recognized. · 
16 
This Horatorium Resolution, as might be expected, had 
considerable opposition. It passed by a vote of 62 in favor, 
28 against, and 28 abstentions. The important factor here is 
that of the twenty-eight negative votes eight were from the · 
Communist Bloc, sixteenwere from coW1tries located in Western 
Europe or the Commonwealth, and the last four were by the 
United States, Japan, Sot.lth Africa, and China. No J .. p,Q.u.s_tria-
li_zeq 9.9ll~~:t:r>Y 'YJ~s in fav?~ ~~ .. ~~~e J,'>6S()l:ution.- The U.S. and 
the USSR vot•;,d 8.gainst this resolutton on the grounds that it 
would 1.n.."11 bit. technological advancement, and that the ob jec~ 
tives of the Committee should not be to issue prohibitions, 
but to insure that technological development and exploitation 
wot1ld not pre judice or make more difficult the solution of' the 
11 r: issues current.ly under exruuinatlon. ""1 ,The representatives 
f1•om the developing nations felt that if the area was to be 
reserved for the benefit of mankind, it was obvious that such 
acti vi t:i.es should be withheld until the es ta.blishment of an 
.. , 
international regime~;' 
/ 
At the recommendation of the Sea-Bed Committee the 
General Assembly·passed its most meaningful resolution during 
the 25th Session. G.A. Reso1ution 2749 (XXV}, entitled 
10u.N. Document A/7630 {1970). 
l~ •. N. _l:!OE:ihly .<~hrorB...£1!, P • 7.3 • 
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"Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof·, beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction," was adopted by a vote of 108 in favor, 
none against, and 14 abstentions.. Of major importance here 
is the fact that no major industrialized country voted against 
the pri.nciples as stated in the declaration. Even though th~:~ 
Soviet Bloc abstained in the voting, there appeared to be a 
general consensus. on the topic as a whole. 
Several ·Of the more important principles of the 
declaratlon stated that the area and the resources of the 
area are the ~common heritage of all mankind; the area is not 
subject to appropriation by any state or person por are the 
rights to the resources .able t.o be appropriated; the explora-
tion of the area shall be carried out for the bene.fit of all 
mankind, and taking into particular consideration·the interests 
and needs of the developing nations; the area shall be 
reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes; and parties to any 
dispute relating to acti.vities in the area shall resolve these 
disputes only using peaceful means as set down in the Charter. 
The I"e.soluti.on also called for the establishment of an 
int~rnat.ional regime l-Jhich would " ••• provide for the orderly 
and safe development of rational management of the area and 
its resources •••• " 
ln another resolution, 2750C {XXV), adopted by a vote 
of 108 in favor, and s.even against (Soviet Bloc) 1 the General 
Assembly decided to convene an international conference in 
1973 which would establish an "equitable international regime 
including an international machinery -- for the area and 
'----'--------~-
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resources of the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction." The conference was also to deal with 
"a broad range of related issues on the laws of the seas." 
In order to prepare for the- conference the Sea- Bed 
Committee reorganized itself into three sub-committees. Sub-
Conli'llittee I was to prepare draft treaty articles embodying the 
I 
international regime for the sea-bed area and its resources. 
Sub-Committee II was to prepare a comprehensive list of 
subjects and. is·sues relating to the law of the sea. Sub·· 
Committee III was to deal with ·the preservation of the marine 
. i d i ·' i fi 12 env ronment an sc ent c reseru:•ch. 
During the 26th Session the General Assembly's 
actions consisted mostly of recognition of.the work of the 
Sea-Bed Committee and the Assembly expressed its desire that 
the wor•k toward the convening of an international conference 
in 1973 should continue. In the resolution (2881 (XXVI)), the 
committee was expanded to ninety-one members and the People's 
Republic_of-China was named as on~ of the new members. 
This brings us up to the most recent actions of the 
United Nations in area of the establishment of a sea regime. 
During the 27th Session, G.A. Resolution 3029A (XXVII) was 
adopted Wlanimously on December 18, 1972. The resolution 
called for the Sea-Bed Committee to continue its work 
preparing for the world conference. The resolution also: 
Reqll~~ the Secretary-General to convene the first 
session of the ~hird United Nations Conference on 
12Pe.tricia s. Rambach, ( ed.), Issues Before the· 26th 
General As~~~.f!!l::l.Y (New .York: Carnegie Endm1ment for Inter:---
national Peace, 1971), p. 81. 
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the f.Jaw of the Sea at New York for a period of 
approximately two weeks in November/D9cember 1973, 
for the pur•pose of dealing l>lith or'gan-J.zatioxial 
matters, including the election of officers, the 
adop~lon of the agenda and the rules of procedure 
of the Confer·-ence l' the es tablishm.ent of subsidiary 
organs and the allocation of work to these subsi-
diai'Y organs; 
Decides to convene the second session of the 
~nee, for the purpose of dealing with 
substantive work, at Santiago, Chile, in April/Hay 
1974,. for a period of eight weeks, and such subse-
quent sessions, if necessary, as may be decided by 
the Conference and approved by the General Assembly, 
bearing in mind that the Government of Austria has 
offered.Vienna ai3a site for the Conference for the succeedmg year; 
Conclusion 
The stage is set for the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law. of the Sea. The success of the con-
19 
ference depends entirely on the attitudes of the states that 
attend. Concrete definitions of the "continental shelf" and 
"territorial sea" should be establishede The problem of 
fishing rights, which is of great importance to many states, 
should also receive the attention of the delegates. However, 
what most states will be looking for is the creation of an 
international regime which will supei•vise the future 
exploitation of the seas. The exact powers and functions of 
the regime will undoubtedly dom.inate much of the debate at 
the conference. It seems likely at this time that if the 
conference, one, uses the "Declaration of Principles Governing 
the Sea .. Bed and Ocean Floor, and the Sub-soil 'I' hereof, beyond 
the Limi·ts of National Jurisdictlon" as a. starting place; and 
13u .N. Docwnent A/RES/3029 ( 1972). (See Infra, P• 94). 
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two, a workable compromise can be reached on the structure of 
the regime as outlined in the draft proposals of the various 
states (especially the United States, Malta, and the Soviet 
Union) then there is a possibility that the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea will be able to 
accomplish some of its objectives. 
'------------
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CHAPTER III 
OCEAN RESOURCES 
A knowledge of the present status and availability of 
ocean resources is vital to the understanding of the proposal 
to establish an ocean regime. , Indeed, it is due to increased 
exploitation of these resources that has called for a sea 
regime. It is hoped that the regime will judiciously allocate 
resources consistent \-Jl th both political and humanitarian 
factors. 
The proposal is unique to international law and 
oz•gan:J.zations s It is questionable whether or not tra.di tional 
forms of international ag1•eement are applicable to esta.b-
lish;l.ng an." ocean regime. Finding a. meaningful form of 
reciprocity and mutual benefit- in allocating resources is a 
far more delicate procedure than recognizing the symbiotic 
nature of an "innocen·t passage" rule. Furthermore, even 
assuming that a satisfactory multilateral method of allocation 
were established initially, how stable would it be in the wake 
of rapi.d technological change that m:l.ght dis1•upt the fairness 
of its distribution? These perplexing questions are not, 
however, the thrust of the current chapter. The purpose here 
is to examine the different cat.egories of ocean resources and 
their effect on the proposed ocean regime. 
Basically, there are three significant types of oce.an 
resources: living resources (mostly fish), offshore petrolewn 
21 
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reserves, and hard mineral deposits -- primarily in the form 
of manganese nodules. 
., All of these resources will have some 
affect on the regime. 'fhe potential impact of the manganese 
nodules, however. seems to be the most ominous. This chapter 
will discuss all :three categories, the first tHo briefly and 
the final one at some length. 
·Today's supply of petroleum has reached the point 
where its eventual depletion is.forseeable (See Appendix A). 
'!'he energy crisis is of particular concex•n to developed 
states, and especially the United Sta..tes.. The reason for the 
concern on the part of. the United States is its vast yearly 
con~mmption of petroleum and natural gas. 
Oil and gas supply approximately three-fourths 
of this Nation's total energy. vJith only 6 pex•cent 
of the world's population, the United States consumes 
32 percent of the v.1£rld 's petr•oleum and .')0 percent 
of its natural gas. . 
United ·States oil reserves have been declining for 
2 
the past decade. As a result the U., S. has been incN1asingly 
concerned l-Ji th finding additional sources of oil. The desire 
for expanded oil sources is continually affecting American 
policy ln the Middle East. The reason fo1• this being that 
the Middle East countries contain (exclusive of offshore 
oil) 11 ••• over 60 percent of the total proven crude 
1 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs. !!.£P.ort_~~e....§E_eci~u..l?..=££.~..2!! 
Outer Continental Shelf, 9lst Congress, 2nd Sess., 1970 
\WasflfngtO.n:-Goverrurient Printi.ng Office, 1970), P• 1. 
2u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, T.Q_)fxQress the Sens!J_~e~a~J.!at .!!~ 
PreJ>i9ent Should •••• ,_ Hearings, 9lst 'C'ongx'ess, 1st Sess .. , 
l9b9 [Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 190. 
<=--'--- ------ ----
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reserves." Some writers in this field maintain that the 
va~t additional reserves of offshore oil have significantly 
lowered the importance of assuring a share of oil from the 
Middle East. Such an assumption may be rather hasty. There 
is no argument on the extent of offshore oil reserves; they 
are plentiful. 
In the area o.f the u.s. continental margin between 
200 meters and the seaward edge of the continental 
rise alone·, there is contained an estimated 867 
billion barrels of oil; 68 billion barrels of natural l~ 
gas liquids; 2,045 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. · 
23 
The point is, rather, that Middle East land~based oil 
is more ma..rketable because it is less expensive to exploit 
-than the vast reserves of. the continental.margin. The reason 
is purely economic. Much. of the oc~an oil sources lie under 
deep water at the.end of the contlnental shelf or beyond. 
~ ' .. -~ ........... _____ .,.._~---·,---·----.. -. ·--~-~--··· .......... -·· ,.···-~--
Even the technological ability.to exploit offshore oil does 
not render it economically feasible.. Elaine Burnell explains 
why: 
Yet, rising teclmological capability does not 
necessarily mean lower costs. In fact, the costs of. 
petrol.EH:tm per barrel rise exponentially with water 
depth. Deep-water oil must compete with shallow-water 
oil and with oil produced on the land, as well as with 
vast amounts of oil potentially available at some\-Jhat 
higher costs from oil shales, tar sands, and the hydro-
genatlon of coal •. ,(One must conclude with T. F. Gaskell 
that it is unrealistic to expect that an ocean regime will 
become rich b~ controlling oil and gas beyond the conti-
nental shelf.!? 
'/ 
' 
3 J8.Illes W. Oswald, "Toward a Political Theory of the 
Ocean," ~.!.PJoi_!;_!ng the Ocean_!, II (June, 1966), p. 370. 
4r
1 
}.QJ?~:£..~ b~ .1!.!.~-~S,.eecial Sub-ccmmitte~_.on Outer Q_o,nt~­
~ntal; . .§.J~JIJ p. ~ 
5F~laine H. Burnell and Piers von Simson, (eds.), f.?cem 
in Marlbus (Santa Barbara: Fund for the Republic, Inc., 197"75); 
P• 3. -
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As the above quotation indicates the significance of an 
ocean regime controlling oil reserves beyond the continental 
shelf would hardly justify its existence. 
The second topic of discussion in this chapter . 
concerns the food resources of the oceans. Traditionally, 
the freedom to fish in the high seas went band in hand with 
the freedom of the sea-. Both of these internati.onal 
"freedoms" are basedon the copcept of inexhaustibility. 
The a.rgument is that since the supply (of fish or water) is 
W1limited, Ltse by one person cannot harm another. Emerich 
De Vattel in 1883 put forth this principle in his book, lli 
~~i-Q. f. .!'!..~ li9!l§.. 
It is manifest that the use of the open sea, \~hich 
consists :i.n navlgation and fishing, is innocent and 
!!!BX~~1!i~1~; that is to say -u· hl3 lcJho navigates 
or• fishes in the open sea does no injury to anyone, 
and the sea, 6in these t\oJO respects, is sufficient for a.ll rnankinq. 
The concept of an inexhaustible supply of fish may 
have been valid in 1883, but it is not true in modern times. 
The myth of abundance is no longer credible. From 
the Second \<Jorld War until 1968, the world catch of fi.sh 
increased at about the rate of 6~7% per year. The catch 
in 1969 was less than tl::tat of the pi•evious year. While 
the 1970 catch is likely to be larger, the past rate of 
inc1 .. ease cannot be ma.i.nta.ined into the future. Recently 
made px•o jections indicate that the rate of. increase -_ 
will only be about 2-lt-% per year until 1985, and may 
even level off after that. But even though the supply 
of fish is liroi ted, the demand will continue to grorJ 7 and the consequences will become increasingly severe. 
6Emerich De Vattel. 'fhe Law of Nations ( Philadel-
-phia~ T. & J. w. Johnson & Con~any;-ld8jf~25. 
7 . 
Fr•a.ncis 11'. Christy, Jr.. "Fishery Problems and the 
U.s. Draft Art:l.cle, •• -(paper z•ead at the 4th Sea Grant Con-
ference, October 13, 1971, Madison, Wisconsin),p. 5. 
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Pnst assumptions of unlimited supplies of natural 
re~ources have continually proven incorrect. Francis Christy 
relates the supply of fish to past beliefs about the supply 
of American range. 
The case of the western range lands is instructiveo 
·In 1870, it reported that 'all the flocks and herds in 
the 't'Jorld could find ample pasturage on these unoccupied 
plains and the mountain-slopes beyond; and the time is 
not far distant when the la.rgest flocks and herds in 
the world wlll be found here, t-Jhere the grass grm·Js 
and ripens untouched from year to year.' Such remarks 
about inexaustibility are not dissimilar to past 
a.ssertions8about the inexhaustibility of the sea's fisheries. 
In modern times regional shortages of certain species 
9 
of fish are not uncommon. 
Despite the growing need for a system of allocating 
the living resources of the sea, it remains unlikely that 
the proposed sea regime could function in this capacity. 
National patterns of fishing are firmly set in traditional 
ways. In addition, and as discussed in Chapter V, the 
.fishing controversy is closely related to the dispute ove1• 
national jurisdiction. It seems that whatever limit prevails 
for national economic zones will also 'serve to create 
enforceable £trea.s of national fishing rights. 
The third category of ocean wealth is hard minerals, 
primarily in the form of maneanese nodules. ·Of all the 
resources discussed ocean reserves of valuable metals seem 
the most inaccessible. However, it appears that the necessary 
technology to economically exploit ocean nodules is already 
8 Chrlsty, p. 2. 
9 Christy, P• I+• 
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being develqped. The potential production o1.~ minerals from 
manganese nodules bear.s the highest significance for an 
ocean regime. It is with respect to the minjLng of nodules 
that an international regime ls most critical.J:y needed to 
perform two vital tasks. One iS to prevent a "gold rush" 
type of confrontation .among the developed na:tlons wishing to 
collect the nodules. · The· second is to protec·t the economies 
of those developing countries whose.GNP depends largely on 
their land-based mining of minerals which the manganese nodule 
may make plentiful (See Appendix B). The dis:cussion that 
follo-ws will present .,information on the extent, value and 
increasing accessibility of manganese rese:t•ve.s e It also 
examines the possible economic impa.ct that la.rge-scale 
production of nodules n~ay have around the w:.:> rld. 
~ The sea today is destined to become the greatest 
resource 1 .. eserve available to mankind. Minerals in the water 
and on the ocean floor are in abundance. The race for 
development and exploitation of these resources will 
inevitably bring about conflict, and inequities will arise 
if exploitation activities are not adequately controlled. 
Ocean resources will affect (in ter•ms of economic 
feasibility, individual national interests, and geographical 
locations) the function and structure of a sea regime. Prior 
to 1970, the impact of the actual importance of sea-bed 
development had not struck its target insofar as national 
interests were·concerned. The need for technological 
development and future prospects toward the oceans was 
deemed inevitable and necessary in order to sustain future 
1·, 
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generations' demands for materials contained on the ocean 
floor. 
Today, technological advancements have permitted us 
to explore the sea-beds. The resources have been found to be 
abundant, and the economic influences have directed the 
attention of many developed nations toward the explo:J.tation 
of these resources •. The sea resources referred to are b1own 
as sea-floor nodules, generally called manganese nodules, 
since manganese is the dominant mineral in these nodules. 
The other major. contents-in these. nodules include nickel, 
coba.l t, copper, zinc,. molybdenum, zirconium, cerium, lead, 
titaniwu, iron, vanadium and several rare earth elements. 
'I'hese nodules are abundant, and uncontrolled exploitation· of' 
tlwse nodules could cause,market "flooding" (See Appendix C). 
According to John 1,. Mero, of the aforementioned metals only 
manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, and zirconi~l 
would be produced in quantities which could upset present 
10 
world sources of these metals. 
The next step in the investigative process is 
·ascertaining how much of a nodule reserve is contained on 
the ocean floor, and the estimated worth of such resourceso 
According to A. M. Auburn: 
One square-mile of the sea-bed floor may be covered 
with 70,000 tons of' nodules, containing 30,000 tons of 
manga.r1ese, 3,600 tons of aluminum, 2,300 tons of cadmium, 
17,000 tons of iron, 400 tons of cobalt, 1,200 tons of 
nickel, and 650 tons of copper. The value of the 
-------------------10 John L. Mero, "A Lega~ Regime for Deep Sea Mining," 
§.!r.l.Qt<2.S2..l!~~~ VII (July, 1970), P• 496. 
~- ---- ---
~---------
~- ---------~--
I 
! 
mangattlse alone can be ashigh as ~9,520~000 per square 
mile. 
28 
According to John L. Mero, there would appear to be 
"about 1.5 trillion tons of nodules now exposed to the surface 
of the sediments of the Pacific Ocean." He goes on to sayf 
that if only ten percent of the deposits prove econo-
mical to exploit, such as manganese, nickel, cobalt, and 
copper, using average percentage of these metals, it can 
only be calculated that the reserves of these metals in 
the nodules are measured in terms of thousands1~f years on the basis of present-day world consumption. 
In effect, the nodule reserves could be considered to be 
unlimited. Another argument supporting this would be the 
point brought up by Fatrick.Childs. "There is some evidence 
to support the contention that these nodules are being manu-
factured on the. ocean floor at a faster r•ate than we aJ:•e using 
' . 13 
the materials on a yearly basis." · 
The abundance of sea-bed resources has drawn the 
.. 
attention of d~veloped nations all. over the t>Jorld. This has 
encouraged competition in the development of machinery and 
techniques for exploitation of these resources ata rapid 
rate and has precipitated a race that almost every developed 
nation is participating in. 
In 1961, the bathyscaphe Trieste I reached the 
deepest sea-bed within the framework of the U.SoNavy 
programme. In 1966, the Trieste II found the main .. 
11 F. M. Auburn, "The International Sea-Bed Area," 
International and Com arative Law , XX (April, 
1971 ' p. 17 • 
12 Auburn, p. 176. 
l3Patrick Childs, "The Interests of Land-Locked 
States In Law of the Sea," San Diegq Law Revt_~, IX (May, 
1972), P• 499. 
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portion of the hull of the sunken nuclear submarine 
Thresher at a 4epth of 8,400 feet. In 1966, the 
submersibles Alvin and Aluminaut aided in the location 
of a lost U. S. hydrogen bomb in deep waters off 
Palomares 3 Spain. Since 1966, the Navy has possessed 
the capability of enabling divers, by a minor surgical 
operation, to descend to 12,000 feet, although this 
has not been tested in the actual environment. In 
1968 1 the U.S. Navy commissioned two deep toJater sub-
mersibles, Sea Cliff and Turtle, three man crerJ 
vehicles, capable of operating at depth~ of several . 
thousand feet. In 1968,. the deep drilling ship Glomar 
Challenger found oil formations in tl1e Sigsbee Knolls 
region in the Gulf of Mexico, at a depth of nearly 
12,000 feet. In 1969, the vehicle Alvin was recovered 
from a depth of over ,5,000 feet :i.n the North Atlantic. 
By 1974, it is expected that the petr•oleum industry 
will have the capability to drill and produce at 
depths of up to 1,,500 feet, and by 19Bo11 the industry expects to be able to reach 6,000 feet. I . 
29 
More important than these steps leading to the actual 
prototypes of sea-bed exploitation is the industrial develop-
ment of sea-bed exploitation machinery itself. The Scripps 
Institution o.f Oceanography is nm.J operating a tank-like 
remote underwater manipule.tor, (RUM), capable of worki.ng i.n 
depths up to 6JOOO feet of water, lifting loads up to 1,000 
lbs. It surveys the ocean floor by 'television and performs 
. . 15 
such tasks as planting instruments on the ocee.n floor. In 
1972, the Hu§:les 'rool Company announced that const1•uction was 
under 'Way on- a three hundred and twer1ty-four foot barge and 
a five hundred and sixty-five foot mining vessel for the 
mining of manganese nodules. 'l'he vessels are designed to be 
operational at depths from 12,000 feet to 18,000 feet. 
These technological advances are due to the econo.:nic 
-------···-----------14 Auburn, P• 174. 
15 . 
Auburn, p. 17.5. 
•= ~----- --- -----
;:-_:; 
~---------- ----
L_ _ _ 
;_::: ___ _ 
ri--
,..-;--------
~ 
F ------------
30 
feasibility of the estimated receipts from resource 
exploitation. Although dependence on the sea-bed for r~sources 
is technically in the experimental and plann+ng stage, it 
should be hereby noted that approximately twenty percent of 
the world supply of oil comes from under the sea. The current 
annual market value of this offshore oil is eight billion 
16 dollars. 
Deep-Sea Ventures, a subsidiary of 'l'ennace, together 
with a subsidiary of a. large German minlng firm, Metall-
gesellschaft, of Frankfurt, is spending between $5 1 000,000 
and $10,000,000 on developing the recovery technology con-
earning resources. This will be sold to a consortium worth 
~ 17 
a capital of between $1,000,000,000 and ~2,000,000,000. 
The product value of one of these operations would be about 
$1.8 billion if all products \<Jer•e sold at today' s market 
price. The capital investment to build the facilities to 
mine and handle SO,OOO tons of the nodules per day can be 
ex~pected to be $200 million. The net profit would probably 
/ J8 
be about $800 million after u.s. taxes.· 
A major concern in the area of economics is the 
distribution of the sea-bed nodules themselves. According to 
John L. Mero, one of the characteristics of the nodules is 
the marked change in the composition over large lateral 
distances in the Pacific Ocean. 
16 
.Auburn, p. 115. 
17 Auburn, p. 176. 
18 
Mero, p. 497 • 
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Along the continents, they are rich in iron, while 
in the central.part of the ocean and on certain 
topographical highs, the nodules tend to be enriched 
31 
in cobalt. In several areas of the Pacific, the 
nodules are almost pure manganese dioxide. In the areas 
of the ocean far removed from islands or continents, 
the nodules are rich in nickel and copper. As the 
equatorial regions are approached, the pe19entage of 
copper in the nodules increases markedly •. 
It can be assumed that due to rapid technological 
developments of deep-sea exploitation machinery and 
tremendous economic possibilities concerning sea-bed resources, 
conflicts will arise over sea-bed rights, rights to profits, 
and benefits of sea resources. These conflicts will inevi-
tably reflect the interests of nation-states. \Many developing~ 
nations are seeking to protect their current land~based 
ms.rkets for minerals, while develop·ed states are anxious to 
add to their dwindling-sources of mineral and petroleum 
reserves.( 
What is the probable economic impact of manganese 
nodules exploitation? Before this question can be answered, 
one must determine, first of all, the probable mineral yield 
from new ocean mining techniques and secondly, the amount of' 
time necessary to build up that yield. 
Estimates are that within the next ten years 1 the 
first operator will be mining and processing the nodules on 
ru1 economic, large-scale basis, at a rate of at least 
3,000,000 tons per year. Within 15 years, at least five 
operators will be mining and processing about 50 million tons 
of the nodules per year. Within the next 30 ye~rs, at least 
19 
Mere, p. 499o 
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50 operators will want to produce about 200 million tons of 
20 the nodules per year. If these estimates are correct, the 
economic impact of ocean minerals will be significant. Such 
a sudden supply will naturally lower the price of those 
minerals being sold on the world market. 
The most important benefit of the exploitation of 
sea-bed resources in the long run is likely to.be the 
expansion of the world resource base of several minerals, 
· some of v1hich might otherwise be in short supply in a 
few decades. 
While this development is beneficial .from a global 
viewpoint, it has already caused concern in developing 
countries that are traditional exporters of some of 
these minerals. These countries fear that exploitation 
of minerals and metals from sea-bed resources, such as 
manganese nodules, might cut into the demand for their 
exports ~nd result in a lower price-level of their 
exports. l · 
Acco1•ding to a study by the U. N. Secretariat, a 
lower market value will benefit the users of hard minerals 
who are primar1ly developed states. 
·It follows from the foregoing [f. .e. sea-bed resources 
will depress pricey that the greater availabilities 
and presum.ed lo\-H3r marginal costs associated with the 
producti.on of minerals from the sea-bed would bring 
direct benefits to the consumers of the minerals 
concerned, l:Jho are, by and large, ~2e mineral-using 
industries in developed countries. -
At the same time many developing nations who rely on land-
based mineral production for a significant portion of their 
GNP would be seriously hurt by a sudden drop in the price of 
minerals. Wolfgang Friedman notes.this situation when he 
20 1'-'lero, p. 499. 
21Rambach, p. 84. 
22u .. N. Document A/AC.l38/73 (1972), p. 28. 
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comments:: 
The economic consequences of exploiting such mineral~, 
as copper or nickel in marketable quantities from nodule --) 
concentratlons is potentially formidable. By making 
certain relatively scarce materials abundant, it could c 
completely upset the international cormnodities markete 
This in turn could deeply affect the attitude of certain 
major producers, like Chile, and to a lesser extent Peru, 
which would have an economic interest in pre2~nting 
exploitation of copper from the ocean floor. 
I 
There is little doubt that uncontrolled market 
flo6ding of certain minerals would cause economic chaos in 
several developing states. The problem is that if ocean 
resources· ar•e developed and mined at present levels of con ... 
sumption and with the full utilization of present technology 
(and developing technology), it has been calculated that on 
the world market, some minerals would drop as much as fifty 
percent in price (See Appendix D} • 24 This would be dev as ta.-. 
ting to developing nations relying on the exportation of 
these minerals. 
An example of market impact is the possible effects 
of sea mining. on the world market for cobalt. 
The impact of sea~bed supply on the cobalt market 
could be quite dra~atic, if the high Co content nodules 
of the mid-Pacific rise were mined. - In this area, west 
of Hawaii, a single mining operation dredging 1 million 
tons of nodules per year with 2 percent Co content would 
be able to supply about 19,200 tons of cobalt. This is 
equivalent to almost the total output from land in 1969, 
and would ~punt to half of the possible 1980 world demand 
.for cobalt • .? 
York: 
The need for an international regime to soften the 
23wolfgang Friedman, The Future of the Oce~ (New 
George Braziller, Inc.,. 1971), p. 22. 
24 . Childs, p. 410. 
25u.N. Document A/AC.138/73, P• 11. 
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impact of ocean mineral production is clear. Indeed, there 
seems to be no alternative to an ocean regime if the effect 
of ocean mining is to be mitigated. This is the conclusion 
of the United Nations' study on the economic impacts of 
ocean mineral production. 
Mineral sea-bed production could not be assumed to 
have such a moderate impact-on world mineral markets 
uriless the.rates at whi~h new supplies were marketed 
were st;rictly controlled by the internationa~6 authority which it is envisaged should be established. 
26 U.N. Document A/AC.l38/73, p. 30. 
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POLITICS 
~------
CHAPTER IV 
... 
A POLITICAL THEORY FOR THE OCEANS 
The purpose of the current chapter is to analyze some 
varying general and philosophical approaches to the sea-bed 
issue. 'l1his chapter, therefore, serves as an introduction 
to the one that follows which deals with specific political 
conflicts related to the sea regime. The point is not to 
present or even to support a particular philosophical bent, 
but rather, to identify and evaluate several different 
approaches. This thesis attempts to present the political 
context and issues involved ln a sea regime in an objective 
and realistic manner Q Therefore, this chapter strives to 
strike a distinction between a philosophical and ideological 
approach versus a realistic and pragmatic one • 
. At the outset it may be prudent to explicate the 
inherent poll tical nature of the sea-bed issue_. The politics 
are both national and international in character. Inevitably 
intermin~led in the political milieu is the escalating 
scientific knowledge and tecnnological developments related 
to the oceans and sea-beds. Scientists are unable to free 
themselves from the political context around the sea-bed 
issue. Robert L. Friedheim has noted this phenomenon. 
Ocean science is inextricably caught up in the 
politics surrounding the uses and expected uses of 
the sea. We can offer no panacea for those ocean 
scientists who would like to assur-e themselves of 
36 
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stable working conditions with the stroke of a pen. 1 
Cop.versely, international political forums, policies, and 
circumstances can be drastically altered by changes in 
scientific knowledge and technological progress. Richard 
Symonds in discussing international functional agencies has 
argued that the attempt by these organizations to separate 
science from politics is futile. 
Yet Science is seldom neutral. The discoveries 
which are promoted by and the innovations \vhich are 
introduced by international functional agencies 
often contain a concea2ed and unappreci.ated element 
of political dynamite. 
The issue at hand is inescapably political and 
international in scope. A ke¥ ____ ~.9l1~~pt in the_ flJ~?~Il.S.~:lglJ ___ of 
v_i_r.tually---any interna-tional cont;poy:~-r-~_y_is the rol._~_,..of 
national_~~~~rests. It is primarily around this concept 
that tho varying philosophical approaches to the sea regime 
issue are set. 
37 
Some authors have rejected the theory of national 
interests and have supplanted alternative rationales. For 
example, Clark M. Eichelberger, writing in the San Diego L~ 
~~~ie~, has argued for replacing national interest with the 
concept of common heritage. He states: 
Another argument directed against the immediate 
establishment of an international agency to administer 
the sea's resources is that successful maritime powers 
cannot place their economic interests in the hands of 
1Robert L. Friedheim and Joseph B. Kadane. "Ocean 
Science in the UN Political Arena,-" .Journal of Haritime Law 
and Comme~, III (April, 1972), p. ~1. 
2Richard Symonds, Internati.onal Administration 
. Its. E;_vol.~_!;ion ancL_Conteme.9rary Appllcations (London: Oxford 
University Pl~ess, 1971), P• 1i1J. 
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a parliamentary majority of the General Assembly in 
which the underdeveloped States have a majority vote~ 
It should be remembered that the resources of the sea 
and seabed are the common heritage not only of the 
maritime powers but of the developing States and the 
landlocked States as well. All of them will be a factor 
in determining the regime of the future.J 
Dr. Eichelberger confuses a realistic political 
argument l-Jith a philosophical or moral judgment. That is to 
say that even if one grants to Dr. Eichelberger that ocean 
resources are the common heritage of all nat ions, more..lly 
speaking, that does not affect the unwillingness of the 
maritime powers to cooperate in_the regime's "immediate 
establishment." Basically, he is asking what should be, to 
control what is. 
A more extensive philosophical framework from which 
to approach the sea regime controversy has been suggested 
by Elisabeth Borgese. She develops her argument based on 
the presumption that the oceans are free and that this status 
, is an old and solid international lawo 
The·oceans are free. The mere thought that they 
could be "appropriated" by any ruler hm·Jever mighty, 
by e.ny nation, no matter ho-vJ vast l ts empire, he.s some-
thing blasphemous about it. The oce ens, 1.n a way, are 
the most sublime expression on earth of what is · 
extra~human, superhuman, indomitable. That the oQefulS 
are free is the oldest of all international laws.~ 
From the assumption that the oceans are free and land 
is not, Dr. Borgese suggests that a dichotomy exists in the 
3 Clark M. 
Bed of the Sea," 
p ~ 349. 
.Eich.e1berger 1 "The United Nations and the 
San Diego La~·J Revie1-1, VI (Ju.ly, 1969), 
l~Elisabeth Borgese, "Tm-Jard an International Oce~m 
Regime,'' Texas ..l.!}ternat ional LaH Ii'orum, V (Winter, 1969), 
p. 216. 
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method of ownership for these respective areas. She holds 
that two opposing laws are at work: the law of the sea (a 
system of collective O"t-mership and freedom'· of use for all) 
versus the law of the land.(the traditional method of private 
ownership by nation-states). Dr. Borgese concludes that the 
conflict between these opposing forms of ownership, rather 
than conflictlng national interests or incongruence betv-Jeen 
national and international interests, is the real crux of the 
sea-bed issue. 
Thus,. it is not really any conflict bett'lleen national 
law and international law that is in the l.vay of the 
international ocean regime. The opposition of what 
appears to be national interests against international 
interests really comes to an opposition of the law of 
the land (whether national or international) against 
the law of the sea (whether national or international). 
This opposition is as much histbrical as political; 
as much economic as historical; as much psychological 
as economic; as much ideological as psychological--at 
which point we close the circle and re-enter at the5 
level of history and politics, in the widest sense. 
Clearly then, as Borgese develops it, the nations of 
the world have two roads to cho6se from. One is to extend 
the law·or the land across the continental shelf down the 
remainder of the continental margin and out over the ocea.n 
floor. The second road is to apply the law of the sea to 
submarine areas. Borgese explains this choice in the 
following passage: 
Two cou~ses are_ open to-mankind. On~ is· to extend 
the law of the land to the submarine, lands. .That is, 
as technology.develops, the developed.nat-i.ons would 
appropriate ever larger portions of the submarine 
lands and subject them to their national juri.sdiction. 
The other course is to extend the law of the seas to 
the ocean floor, adding a further freedom to those 
5 Boreese, p. 22). 
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embodied in the Conventions on the High Seas by 
declaring that the ocean floor and its resources are 
the property of mankind as a \-Jhole, are G(jd' s road,. 
and cannot be appropriated by ony Nation. 
In the final analysis Dr. Borgese views the choice 
between the two systems described above as a choice between 
40 
a peace system and a war system. She further maintains that 
combining the law of the seas for the high sea with a law of 
the land for submarlne territory will.fail due to inherent 
conflicts in their nature. 
Borgese concludes her agreement with the follOi·Jing 
statement • 
. Thus, the conflict is between the law of the land 
and the law of the sea. Considering that ocean space 
is an ecological 1-1hole, it seems logical that we cannot 
have one kind of regime for the deep seas (the law of 
the land, baaed on ownership, territoriality, sovereignty) 
and another kind of regime for the high seas or super-
jacent l~s.ters (the law of the sea, based on common 
property, nonterritoriality, and trans-sovereignty)o 
If these two systems are conflicting, they e.re bound to 
clash and one will prevail. The law-of-the-sea system, 
however, is a peace system, a system of mutual coopera-
tion. The lEnJ-of-the-land sy~tem is a war system, a 
system of exclusion, competi tton e.nd conflict. Hence, 
our option ought to be clear. 
The approach expounded by Elisabeth Mann Borgese a.nd 
paraphrased above is subject to question. An examination of 
its tenets and conclusions may be instructive. As with most 
systems oftmught, the crucial point is often in the begin-
ning -- the assumptions upon. which later arguments or 
conclusions are 'based. Eorgese begins her statement (as 
quoted above) Hi th the sentence, "The oceans a1~e free, 11 and 
6 
Borgese, p. 220. 
7 Borgese, p. 226. 
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two sentences later, "That the oceans are free is the oldest 
8 
of all international laws." Dr. Borgese implies that 
international law, or the age of this law and not national 
interests is what keeps the oceans free. This is a misunder-
standing of. the role of international law. The causal link 
has been reversed.. It is the mutual interests. o-f nat·ions 
·--·--"····~·~•··•·••"''''"·" ··•·' • .. ,, --•· ·····•• """'" •••• ... •""••''"'•'>•-"'·"·-.n,,••'""·~-~, ·•··••· • ·• • 
which .allows···internationaL l.!'l:.!L:t-.9. exist and .. UQ~ .Y~?~ .Y~rsa. 
Myres s. McDougal aptly clarifies the juxtaposition of 
international law and national interests. 
Thus, when one contraposes international law and 
the vital interests of states, one is creating an 
opposition that we simply cannot live with. Inter-
national law is established and maintained only 
because·it9secures and protects the vital interests or· states. . .· .. 
One piece of supportive evidence for McDougal's. 
thesis is the px•i.nc:i.ple in international law of r_~s si_~, 
~~(while things thus stand). This principle implies 
that treaties "cease to be obligatory when the conditions 
10 
upon which they were founded have substantially changed." 
Borgese 1 s implication that age will add credence to 
an international law does not stand· true. A nation whose 
vital intex•ests run counter to even, the oldest international 
law is not likely to continue its observance. A clear 
example is current claims by some countries of' a 200 mile 
8 
Borgese, p. 226. 
9 . 
Alexander, p. 1. 
10 Urban G. Whitaker Jr., Politics and Power A Text 
in International Law (New York: Harper -&-Row-;-1964), p; 'b54. 
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territorial zone despite a long-standing limit of three 
miles, traditionally observed by virtually all -nations.· 
It seems that Dr. Borgese fails to understand why 
the oceans are free. She maintains that it is because of 
the law of the sea, which is a collective and cooperative 
system. Once again she·assumes law to. be the causal factor 
I 
rather than politics. Urban Whitaker has a different view 
of the relationship of international law to politics. 
Again it seems inappropriate to attach more 
relevance to legal than to political considerations 
in such a situation. States which have the power 
to do so will exercise de facto control over such 
maritime waters as they deem necessary to the 
security and1~rosperity of their territories and populations. 
The freedom of the seas existed historically because 
no single nation had the poHer nor the will to control the 
seas. Today much of the freedom· of the.seas rests upon the 
advantages of reciprocity for free passage and uninterrupted 
trade. The freedom of the .sea, therefore,. does not stem from 
some my~tical transformation in human nature as he passes 
from land to sea as Dx•. Borgese ·suggests with her opposing 
legal systems for earth and water. 
In today's world the capability to control more and 
more ocean space is rapidly increasing. This situation 
places more reliance upon reciprocity to maintain the freedom 
of the seas. The principle of reciprocity requires countries 
to consider more than their immediate gain in protecting 
their national interests. Lewis Alexander provides an 
11 
Whitaker, p. 312. 
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excellent example of this in the following quotation: 
To persona·not acquainted with the national interests 
of the United States in the world as a. whole, or not 
concerned therewith, the national interest in our coastal 
waters is to establish boundaries as far out into the 
ocean as we can get away with and establish exclusive 
jurisdiction over everything therein to the United States. 
The trouble with this parochial view is that what-
ever the United States can do in this respect it has·to 
agree that other countries can do the same thing, The 
reaction we got from the blunder of issuing the ·rruma.n 
Proclamation on Fisheries in September, 1945, is that 
other countries t-Jill claim moz•e than any new claim the 
United States makes, deliberately interpret the new 
claim the United States makes. in their favor, and use 
our new claim,. their new claim, and their misinterpre-
tation of our new claim, as.substant:J:.ation for eny 
acti.on .they wish to1zake over and above what the United States wants to do. 
In the final analysis, then, the problem of 
establishing an ocean regime is not. a choice between opposing 
systems of international law but rather a complex political 
problem. Arvid Pardo confirms this sentiment: 
Thus, the creation of an international regime for the 
sea-bed is not merely a legal task, .. but is assent ially a 
delicate political task that must balance f~ndrunentally 
different, but basic, poll tical ·interests e 
. It is the intent of this thesis to analyze the isstles 
related to the ocean regime in a pragmatic and realistic 
manner rather than viewing them through the lens of a 
preconceived philosophy. There is, of course, danger in 
assuming that because one speaks of rational interests and 
realism that he- is avoiding philosophical bias~ Advocates of 
12 Alexander, p. 12.5. 
l3Arvi.d Pardo, "An International Regime for the Deep 
Seabed:: Developing Lat~ or Developing Anarchy?'t Texas 
International L~ Forum, V (Winter, 1969), p. 21S. 
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"realism" can become a drag on 'possible political solutions 
and innovations by too narrowly construing a nation's 
interests or the possibllities for compromise and progress. 
Wolfgang Friedmann in his book, The Future or the o~~an~, 
speaks to this point: 
Even the most short-sighted advocates of "national 
i-nterests" Cl:).n hardly welcome a world in lvhich groups 
41+ 
of states will claim vast stretches of the seas around 
them as their own, while others extend sea-bed operations 
further and further outward, with the inevitable result 
of Jg~creasing curtailment of internationa~ fishing end 
ni:x~7~!1t'gation, and the threat of confrontation, at the 
bottom of the oceans 11+ ~:o_day' s "realismtt becomes the 
madness of tomorrow. 
In this thesis, and particularly in the current 
·sect ion, dealing t.zith the. political issues, an attempt is 
made to use realismand the analysis. of national interests 
as an analytlcal tool rather than a philosophical approach& 
The pitfalls that Pr·ofessor Friedmann -\-larns of are realo The 
self-fulfilling prophecy of "realistic pessimism" can hinder 
new avenues of international cooperation. It is also easy 
however,· to fall back on an overs:tmplified and optimisti.c 
approach as Dr. Borgese has -done. In conclusion, the pur• 
pose here is to avoid these extremes, to use realism in the 
analytical sense, to consider the problems and issues as 
they are and not to predict or suggest solutions. 
1~riedmann, p. 81. 
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CHAPTER V 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONFLICTS 
The study of international relations in modern times 
has witnessed t~Jo dynamic conflicts in the world. One is· 
the struggle between East and West (competition between the 
superpowers). The other is a North-South struggle between 
the developed and developing nations. John G. Stoessinger 
in his book, The Migh~ __ of ~ati~~~, has centered on these 
conflicts. Stoessinger says of his own wo~k; 
••• the book is focused upon what the author believes 
are the two truly dominant events of' our time: the 
struggle of East ve.rsus West, aY:d the stl"•uggle of 
nationalism versus colonialism. 
The- sea-bed issue has served to bring the latter 
ciash into focus. It is primarily around the opposition of 
the developed and developing countri'es that the .important 
issues related to a sea regime are organized. The North~ 
South struggle has become, in this arena at least, the 
predominant conflict. The superpowers find themselves uneasy 
partners since many of their national interests coincide -with 
regard to a sea regime. Often when the interests of the 
superpowers coincide, agreement and progress are expedited. 
In this case, as with others in international affairs, 
the serving of superpower interests is a prerequisite 
1 John G. Stoessinger·, The t>Iigh~ .. ~~-J::!ations (New York: 
Random House, 1969), P• 5 •. 
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to real progress. Senator Pell draws this point: 
Among these realities, or obstacles in the view· 
of some, are the interests of the United States, of 
the Soviet Union, and of other maritime powers, and 
these interests must be adequately recognize~ and 
protected if any regime is to exist in fact. 
Due to the interplay of both the North-South and 
East-West struggles, however, the situation is far more 
I 
complex than just meeting basic superpower interests. The 
appeasement of developing cotmtries and thei.r suppol"t has 
become a goal of superpower competition. '11 herefol~e, the 
interests of the developing countr~e_f)_El:re l).()t ).t~E!JY _:to be 
--
completely ignored by the superpowers. As a result the 
proposal to establish an ocean regime faces a dilemma and a 
current sta.lemateo The developed nations, in the meantime, 
are pu:r.'suing tll.eir.own economic end,s whichare often 
explained in altJ:•u.istic terms .. 
••• too often the developed have talked as if the 
schemes they propose concerning the law of the sea were 
pure altruism, having nothing to do lid th thei.r national 
interests, and put forth entirely. to pr•otect the inter ... 
ests of the world conununity as a." whole. In some 
respects," these assertions are correct. In other 
respects they are pnre sham--as the developing claim. 
Such cynicism among the developing is 1ustified if 
only because it is difficult for even the developed 
sponsors to3separate the self .. serving from the altruistic. 
46 
A rather convincing example of this mixture of self-
interest and altrLlism is the October 30, 1968 statement of' 
2 
Elisabeth M. Borgese, (ed.), Pacem in Maribu~ (New 
York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1.972), p. 2.31. 
3Robert L. Friedheim, "A Law of the Sea Conference-· 
Who Needs It?" (unpublished paper prepared for the Symposium 
on International Relations and the Future of Ocean Space, 
April 12, 1972, University of South Carolina), p. 5. 
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President Nixon regarding the oceans. On the one hand, the 
United States'. intention to guard national in:terest is 
clearly stated:-: 
47 
Making full use of the 1966 Act, it will be a first 
priority of my Administration to present to the Congress 
an integrated and. comprehensive program in oceanography. 
The purpose of this program will be to: 
••ePromote international cooperation when such 
cooperation is in the best interests of the United 
States.4 
In the same statement improving the economic position of the 
United States in the fishing 1.ndustry is rationalized on the 
basis of feeding the hungry peoples of the woz•ld. 
The United States fishing industry has deteriorated, 
and I have spoken before of the failure of our existlng 
· Federal programs to encourage the fishing industry to 
modernize fast enough to counter foreign competition. 
But fleet modernization is only one of the many types 
of technologicaL e.dvances that can bring the United 
States back to a position of leadership in the fishing 
industry-~and enable· us to reap a he.rvest from the sea 
that \dll provide an inexpenslve source of r.:Protein 
.ror the malnourished peoples of the world._:) . 
Currently, the.world's fish supply of many species 
cannot withstand another fully modernized fishing fleet.-
Wolfgang Friedmann has observed that tra.•Jlers from the Soviet 
Union and Japan, which have developed fish processing ships 
and mass fishing techniques ha.ve been indiscriminately over-
fishing. Some ships actually "herd" entire schools of fish 
by sonar. This type· of unregulated "'fishing" has resulted 1.n 
near extlnction of many species of whales and a rapid 
decrease in other commpn sea fish such as the California 
4Padelford, P• 337• 
5Padelford, P• 334· 
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6 sardine, Northwest Pacific salmon, and the Barents Sea codo 
Despite the dtLnger• of overf:t.ahing, (another example 
of the mixture of self-interest and altruism) the USSR 
maintains it has, and is, conserving llving ocean resources. 
Mr .. Khlestov made the follm.Jing statement be.fore the United 
Nations Sea-bed Co~~ittee: 
'l'he· question of fishing was. related t.o that of the 
territorial sea~ It was a difficult issue, but agree-
ment had already been reached on the principle of 
rational exploitation of living resources; all countries 
had stated that they were taking
7
steps to ensure the 
conservation of those resources. 
The fishing issue, while not directly germane to the ocean 
regime, illustrates the propensity of nations to m.ix self 
interest with altruism. Proposals for an ocean reglme face 
this-identical problem. 
It is the main purpose of -the present chapter to 
examine some of the critical political issues involved in the 
sea-bed proposal. In analyzing each issue particular atten-
tion will be paid to the conflicting interests of the deve-
loped and developing nations. The three issues of discussion 
in this chapter are: one, national jurisdiction; two, 
scientific research and the effects of technology; and three, 
timing of the regime. 
Def';_ning National Jurisdiction 
In the present examination of the issue of defining 
national jurisdictions analysis is made of the conflicting 
interests between developed and developing states, as well as 
6Friedmann, P• 27. 
7u.N .. Document A/AC .. l38/SC. II/SR.l4 (1971), P• 147. 
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between coastal and non-coastal nations. Also included in 
this section is a discussion of some of the various proposals 
for establishing uniform boundaries .. for coastal states. 
The importance of establishing natlonal boundaries on 
the continental shelf and the territorial sea with regard to 
an ocean regime should be self-evident G Clearly, the fur•ther 
national jurisdictions extend on the continental shelf the 
less important a regime will be. The.value of the resources 
or the continental ·shelf are inversely proportional to theil" 
distance from the coast-line. 
Whether a wide-band or a narrow-band concept of 
national jurisdiction ultimately prevails will make an 
enormous difference in the potential economic value of 
ocean resources coming under·· the control of an ocean 
regime ••• ~If an ocean regime controlled the disposition 
of all resoul'ces beyond the traditional three-mile 
limit, it would possess bi~lions of dollars of assets 
even u.n.der existing technologies of t'ecovery. If, 
on the other hand, its aLtthol"i ty began two htmdred miles 
Ol." lll0r'6 from every coast ... J.ine 1 the present f3COUOnliC 
value of its resources would be negligible. 
If the goal of establishing a meaningful regime is to 
be realized, a somewhat restricted national· boundar·y is called 
for, and soon. Under the cLtrrent, law of the seas, nations 
may collect the resources of the continental shelf by the 
principle of exploitability. Article 1 of the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf reads: 
F•or the purpose of these articles, the term 
"continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to the sea-
bed and sub-soil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a 
depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the 
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the ex~loita­
tion of the natural resources of the said areas.~ 
s·-·-··,·c-... 
Burnell, p. 1. 
9u.N. Document A/Conf. 13/L55, p.l. 
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Due to current economic pressures the exploitability 
principle is being· used to :!.ts fullest, as Norman J. 
Padelford concludes: 
The search for new supplies of food and natural 
resources, for additional trade and security is 
fostering fresh activity in the oceru1s as well as 
drawing nations lnto closer contact. G:l.ven the differing 
outlooks, needs and aspirations of states, it is essen-
tial that national policy be prepared to deal with a 
variety of contingencies. This leads to speculations on 
the models that are available for the guidance of future 
marine policy ••• The most obvious course for most states 
to take is to extend their national jul0sdiction over wider belts of ocean off their shores. 
Technology is rapidly making the resources of the 
continental shelf available to private companies. In 
addition, entrepreneurs have begun to create other schemes 
for using the continental shelf such as building islands 
beyond r•ecognized national boundaries. '.!.'he United States 
government bystopping such ventures has, de facto, assumed 
jurisdic·tion beyond existing boundaries. Senator Claiborne 
Pell cites an example of this practice: 
··At a point some 200 miles off the coast of Oregon, 
another sea-mount nearly breaks the surface. Here 
again a private American company wanted to create an 
island, but our Federal Government refused approval ••• 
our Government, in refusing to give its citizens 
permission to1ict, is in effect saying that it has jurisdlction. 
The question of a fixed definition for national 
jurisdiction is both vital and pressing. The decision 
reached on the limits of national jurisdiction will, in 
10 Padelford, p. 261. 
11u.s., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., lst Sess. 
(1968), CXIV, No.4, 5181. 
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effect, allocate the available resou.rces of the sea and 
determine the importance of any type of ocean regime. 
The question of the limits of the territorial sea is 
a matter of international law.. Legal maritime boundaries 
have historically been an important part of the international 
law of the sea. In attempting to predict "YJhat boundaries t-Jill 
be settled on at'the upcoming Conference on the Law of the 
Seas, or simply to analyze the current situation, it is 
important to note the relationship of international law to 
politics~ Urban Whitaker in his book f2_illics ~q . .I~g!IJU:, 
comments on this relationship. 
Several t•ules--including the tlu•ee-mile limit and 
the rule of. historic bays--have evolved to help 
govern the fixing of boundaries 1 but all of them give 
way :r•egula:r:•112to the basic rule that law is subordinate to politics. 
To exs.mi.ne, then, the current situation with regard 
to establish:tng fixed boundaries one must examine the poli~ 
tical interests of the. concerned nations or groups of nat:i.ons. 
Primarily, there are two sets of nations \'!Jith directly 
opposing interests: the developed versus the developing 
nations and the coastal versus the non~coastal nations.• The 
clash between the two groups of the former pair is best illus-
trated by the running controversy between the United States 
and several La.tin American countries which have claimed exc1u-
sive right over ocean resources within 200 miles from their 
shores and have striven to enforce these rights. The 200-mile 
limit is for many developing nations an attempt to protect 
12 . Whitaker, P• 309. 
C--~ 
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ocean resources from the hands of the developed countries. 
Robert Friedheim has noted the importance of this policy to 
the Latin American states. 
A number of developing states, especially Latin 
American, have pointed out that their territorial 
definitions are an lnherent part of their nationalism. 
No regime would survive long if it voted contrary to 
the national myth ••• What is important is that these 
developing states have backed themselves into a corner 
on their favorite proposals we ought not to expect 
their acceptance of the ensuing convention. · In 
summary, \ole ape not going to get sensible solutions to 
ocean problems if we force symbol:l.c issues to a Yjte. 
Such advice would be a prescription to disaster. 
On the other hand, developed nations, such as the 
.52 
United States, are not anxious to lose their distant"water 
fishing resources •. If the U.S. recognized a 200 mile limit, 
it would have to relinquish nearly all distant~water fishing. 
This sentiment i.s expressed by John Stevenson in a statement 
before the United Nations Co~nittee on the Peaceful Uses of 
the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (Sea-Bed Committee). 
However, the fact that over 80 percent of our 
fisheries are off our own coast does not mean that we 
are prepared to abandon the remaining s:a percent, the 
distant-water segment of our industry. 
The conflict of interests between coastal and non-
coastal states is also an intense problem. Non-coastal 
·states are almost entirely dependent upon the goodwill of the 
coastal states for a share of the ocean's resources. Evan 
Luard has outlined the problem well: 
l)Friedheim, A Law of the Sea, p. 16. 
14'U.s. Calls for Prompt Internatlonal Action to Settle 
Problems of Law of the Sea, 11 _Th~_,pep£!-rt.m~nt of St.at·e Bul~etin, 
LXVII (October, 1972), P• 385. 
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The second vital question concerns the outer 
limit of national control. Here there is an absolute 
conflict of interest between the coastal and non-
coastal states. 'l'here is a real danger that .the coastal 
states, perhaps encouraged by the Latin Anwrican 
·example, may increasingly jump on the 200-mile bandwagon 
to grab the largest possible proportion of the resources 
for themselves. This would largely exclude the non-
coastal states from sharing in the benefits, at least 
in oil and gas, for the foreseeable future. It will 
thus be an interesting test whether some of the bigger 
developing countries, such as Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile, are willing to show in their polici.es the same 
concern for small and poor neighbors that they demand 
the rich countries show them. ~ 
The answer to the question of whether the large 
developing countries will be willing to help the poorer 
land-locked nations by abandoning a 200 mile limit might be 
inferred from the stubbornness of these nations to compromise 
on this issue. As an example, consider the following state-· 
ment by Hr. Saraiva Guerre.i.ro (representative from Brazil) 
before the Sea-Bed Committee: 
;f-- It has been claimed that the adoption by coastal 
states of a 200-mile tel"•ri torial sea would be disasterotls,r--
f'or international trade, as if it would necessarily p_..-----·) 
follow that those States would harrass merchant shipping 
in their water•s. The fact that the principle of innocent . 
passage had been consistently· and universally respected 
sufficed to dlgsolish such figments of over-fertile 
imaginationso 
'l'he political context of es tabllshing fixed boundaries 
for the sea. and the continental shelf is intricate. Yet it 
is further complicated by the dilemma faced by developed 
coastal states. 
The great· powers, like the United States and the 
1.5 
Evan 'Laurd, "Who Gets lrJhat on the Seabed?," 
Foreigq Policz IX (Winter, 1972-73), p. 146 • 
. 16 
U.N. Document (A/AC 138/SC II/SH 14), p. 14. 
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Soviet Union, find themselves in an ambiguous position. 
On the one hand, they favor ·a narrovJ concept of national 
jurlsdiction in order to preserve maximmn freedom o·f 
the·sea.s for their commerce and their navies. On the 
other hand, they covet possession of the resources in 
and under the oceans along their lengthy coastlines. 
As a ~esult of these conflicting interests, a bewil-
dering variety of national claims of exclusive fishing, 
mineral, navigational, and other rights over ne.djacent 
water," "territort_'l seas," and "continental shelves" 
has proliferated. 
A probable guess at the outcome of this collage of 
political interests is an expanded boundary for the terri-
torial sea to at least 12 miles, a fairly extensive claim to 
the continental shelf beyond the 200 meter isobath, and a 
possible concession of expanded-economic zones for countries, 
·~·--·····~ 
such as the-Latin American ones, which have very short 
continental shelves. 
The1~e have been several draft conventions for an ocee.n 
regime that have suggested various limitations on national 
jurisdiction. The four considered in this paper are the u.s. 
draft, the USSR draft, the Pell draft and the Draft Statute 
by Elisabeth Borgese. All of these parties favor a 12 mlle 
limit on the terri tor:1.al sea.; however, the proposals for 
limits o.n the continental shelf vary considerably. The Pell 
draft is most considerate to coastal states proposing a. limit 
at a depth of 600 meters. This limit, however, creates a high 
degree of difference in the extent of shelf that individual 
countries could claim. As Elisabeth Eorgese has pointed out: 
17 
Burnell, P• 1. 
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Another point in the Pell Treaty that remains open 
·to question is the deflni tion of the ocean floor. 'l'he 
Treaty proposes to limit the continental shelf--subject 
to the jurisdiction of the coastal State--to a depth of ~ 
six hundred meters, abolishing the open-endedness of ~.) 
the Geneva Convention of 1958 but setting a depth limit ~­
that is neither geologically nor politically justifiable~ 
For some States, with a steep dropping coast line, this 
would include an area of less than t\-Jelve mile§; for 
others it would extend for hundreds of miles.lo ~ 
Dr. Borgese suggests instead that: 
The continental shelf should not extend beyond a 
depth of two hundred meters of the superjacent t-Jaters 
or a distance of fifty miles from the base line from 
which th~ territorial sea is measured, whichever is 
1'arther.l9 
This proposal is really a minimal one and it is questionable 
whether the majority of coastal states would accept it. 
The USSR draft has side-stepped the limits :l.ssue. 
Consistent with their policy that it is too early to 
establish an ocean regime with licensing pol-:ers, the Russians 
have cbosen to omit from their draft any proposals on the 
limits of the sea-bed. 20 
In contrast the u.s. draft has suggested the most 
detailed proposal. It provides foi' a limit at a depth of 200 
meters but not to exceed 60 nautical miles in width, with 
21 
some exceptions for irregularities in the sea-bed. In 
addition, the u.s. draft suggests the establishment of a 
18 
· El:i.sabeth M. borgese, The Ocean Regime (Santa 
Barbara: Fund for the Republic, Inc., 19b8"J ~· p. 4. 
19Borgese, The. Ocean Regime, P• 10. 
20u.N. Document A/AC 138/43 (1971), p. 2. 
21 U.S. Congress, Sena.te, Co~j. ttee on Interior and 
Insu.lar Affairs, Issues Related to Es't.ia.blishment of Seaward 
Boundar~, Hearing, 9lst Gong., 2nd Sess:-TI970} (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 71. 
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trustee system to supervise the exploitation of resources 
between the 200 meter isobath and the end of the continental 
margin. Under this system the coastal state would have 
control of \-lho exploits resources in the trusteeship area but 
the profits would be shared with the international community. 
This share is proposed to be between one half and two thirds 
of the proceeds from resources taken from the trusteeship 
area. 
A system of graduated jurisdiction, such as that of 
the trusteeship proposal, is probably the most feasible 
approach to the problem of defining national jurisdiction. 
The concept of gradually loosening national control is 
essential to a workable internation.al regime for the oceans. 
The ideals consistent with existing maritime law. -As 
William Griffin has observed:: 
Traditional maritime law divides ocean space into 
four zones in which the coastal state's authoriti 
becomes less absolute seaward until it becomes merged 
into ••• the freedom o:f the high seas:22 
Indeed, graduated jurisdiction may provide a way to 
compromise the short-term economic interests of coastal 
states, which call for national control of as much of the 
continental shelf as possible, with the interests of develop-
ing and non-coastal states, as well a.s the interests of the 
world community, which wot1ld opt for peaceful and equitable 
exploitation of ocean resodrces. For proponents of a strong 
regime that would command control over valuable resources now, 
22 William L. Griffin, "The Emerging Law of Ocean 
·Space," !he International Lawy~, I (July, 1967), P• 553. 
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one can only apologize because politicalli it seems 
impossible. HoHever, if these proponents are willing to 
literally give ground in exchange for a strong regime in 
deeper water, the future may see a strong regime in control 
or a considerable amount of valuable resources currently 
unexploitable due to the lack of necessary technology. 
Overall, 'these conflicts are the barriers through 
which we must pass in ordet• to achieve our goal of 
structut•ing a sea regime for the benefit of all mankind •. 
As former President Lyndon B. Johnson declared on July 13, 
1966:: 
Under no circumstance, we believe, must we 
ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and 
mineral wealth to create a new fdrm of colonial 
competition among maritime nations. We. must be 
careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the 
lands under the high seas. !tie must insure that 
the deep seas and the ocean bottoms are~3and remain, the legacy of all human beings~ 
Scientific Research and th~Effect§_ of .T~c}mologx_ 
The second area for discussion concerns the effects 
of oceanographic research and tec~~ological advancements 
57 
related to the seas. In many respects the problem of peace-. 
fully allocating ocean resources began with incr~ased 
scientific knowledge and subsequent t~chnological capacities. 
It "tJas scientific inquiry that dis covered the existence of 
oil off the coasts of many states. 'l'hat same inquiry 
uncovered manganese nodules on the ocean floor. Due to these 
23 Eichelberger, P• 340. 
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discoveries efforts were made to create the necessary 
technology to exploit these resources. In this process a 
critical international problem is created--how shall these 
resources be allocated? The conflicts over the political 
question of allocation have the potential of upsetting world 
peace rutd stability. Scientific research and technological 
advancements have become issues in the sea-bed dispute. 
The developed states have what amounts to a virtual 
monopoly on scientific exploration and new technological 
means. In accordance with their national interests, they are 
pursuing the new possibilities of economically extracting 
valuable ocean resources. - The developing nations, on the 
other hand, have begun to fear a widening gap between them 
and the developed countries due to the disadvantaged 
technologies of the developing states. 
The concez•n expressed by the developing nations is 
well founded. Professor Padelford explains why: 
At the same time it is only fair to recognize the 
cry uttered by many of the developing countries, which 
lack the technology and economic strength to explore 
and exploit the sea beds off their shores, that the 
present regime of the seas does not allow them equal 
opportunity to utilize the2ytarine.resources needed for their own economic growth. · 
As a result of the possible economic bind that many 
developing states may be put into, they have reacted against 
scientific research itself, fearing a scientific form of 
"colonialism. 11 Rober~ Friedheim provides the details on 
this point. 
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research off the shores of certain coastal states, 
to long, onerous applicati~~s for clearance far in 
advance of actual cruises. 
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Indeed scientific communities themselves have become 
embroiled in conflict over this problem. The United States 
oceanographic community, for example, is caught in a conflict 
between the interests·of the developing natlons and forceful 
interests on the 'domestic scene. Several spokesman for non-
Western and Latin American states are skeptical about the 
motivation and value of scientific research related to the 
oceans. They feel it is dil'•ectly tied to military and 
industrial intei•ests which all too often benefit the developed 
' 28 
countries at the expense of the developing nations. 
In short, political ramifications.b.ave begun to upset 
previous attitudes toward oceanographic research as neutral 
and amoral p1~ocess. Developing nat:i.ons recognize that they 
cannot compete wlth the developed states in the scientific or 
technological arena. Their hope in the sea- bed con trover·sy 
is to establish some .form of redistribution of ocean resoui .. ces 
to offset their lack of technological capacities. 
Padelford outlines this situation: 
Norman 
The different capabilities of states to apply 
modern technology and engineering to the use of the 
oceans r•epresent another dimension of the problem 
at the international level, This is expressed in 
the demand voiced by many developing countries to 
have the United Nations take control of the deep 
sea-beds, to license exploitation of mineral 
resources found therein, and to require a sharing 
either of the resourqes extracted therefrom or of 
27 King, P• 1. 
28 
King, P• 4. 
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61 
The developed states, in contrast, want the oppor-
tunity to develop their technological capabilities to exploit 
ocean resources at a profit. It follows that those countries 
or enterprises engaged in producing systems for ocean 
exploitation want their investments protected. Developed 
states i.n general wish to provide such pl,otection for their 
nationals. For instance, the United States Department of 
State has issued the following statement: 
The Department does not·anticipate any efforts to 
discourage u.s. nationals from continuing with their 
current exploration plans. In the event that u.s. 
nationals should desire to engage in commercial 
exploitation prior to the establishment of an inter-
nationally agreed regime, we would seek to assure · 
that their activities are conducted in accordance 
with relevan-t principles of international law, 
including the freedon1 of· the seas and that the 
.integrity of their investment receives due3Brotection in any subsequent international agreement. 
Currently there is little hope for settlement of the 
differences between the developed and developing on the 
sea-bed issue. Perhaps the possibility of a sudden techno-
logical break-through that would make many ocean resources 
immediately marketable has left both groups ambiguous as to 
the direction in which their best interests lie. For 
whatever the reason, a deadlock exists on establishing an 
international regime to control ocean resources, a goal all 
groups ostensibly favor. Thus, the question of when, if at 
all, the regime will be established ls an important one, and 
29 Padelford, P• 309. 
30 . R~J2..2rt by :t.he S_peclal S9-b .. 9o!Mlitte~- on Ou~~£. 
Continental Shelf, p. 23. 
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the topic of the final sectlon of this chapter •. 
TimiRg of the Regim~ 
As disc u.s sed previously, the rapid development of 
ocean technology, as well as other factors, have put the sea 
regime issue under time pressure. To achieve the goals that 
many of its proponents hope.for, an ocean regime must be 
established before wholesale exploitati.on of ocean resources 
begins. Guenter Weissberg has observed~ 
Time is of the essence if marlne imperialism, 
serious conflict and dangerous competition are to be 
avoided5 The existence of many complexities cannot 
be denied, but neither can this be regarded as a 
unique phenomenon nor an insoluble obstacle. Once 
nation ... states come to realise in earnest that in the 
f'inal analysis it is in their interest nto avoid a 
race to grab and to hold the lands under the high 
seas" .. as President Johnson phrased it, realistic 
legal pr1nciplej1cin be developed which will be of 
·benefit to all. 
Despite the urgency that many say is essential to an 
effective regime, progress toward its creation is moving very 
slowlyo The question, why are things at a standstill, may 
provide some insight into the situation. Professor Friedheim 
feels both the developed and the developing are at fault. 
Developed and developing have contributed equally 
to this impasse. Both Hill have to contribute to 
getting us out. Nevertheless, it is the contention 
of this paper tha.t the impasse. should have been 
avoided primarily through a more perceptive set of 
tactical policies on the part of the developed. The 
developed should have been able to foresee in what 
direction a UN SeaG·bed Commi t.tee vJOuld go e.nd then have 
acted accordingly. Instead, events were allowed to 
31 Guenter Wei.ssbert, "International Law Meets the 
Short-Term National Interest," International Law ~a.ra-
~ive Q_uar~.r:J~, XVIII (January,-i969) 1 P• 101. ·-· --
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32 take their course. 
Professor Fr•iedheim basically makes two asserti·ons; 
63 
one, that the developed and developing nations are equal in 
blame for the deadloc,k; and two, that the developed countries 
should have been able to prevent the impasse. The second of-
these assumptions is more of a moralistic statement than an 
observation. Even if the developed states could have 
prevented the current stalemate, the more pertinent question 
is did they wish to prevent it. The first of Friedheim's 
statements sounds more llke marriage counseling than accurate 
political analysis.. The author maintains that it is 
primarily the developed countr:tes • that are favored by the-
status quo a..'l'ld, in addition, as time pas~es and technology 
develops, their position will continue to improve over that 
of the developing countries. As evidence of this situation 
considez~ the approach of several key developed states. - The 
United States, for example, despite its proposed draft treaty 
is actually stalling on this issue. Senator Pell notes this 
situation. 
In the United States, the boundary question involves 
considerations of national security, of freedom of the 
sea, of the varied interests of the oil industry and 
of other i.ndustries who may ultimately be mining the 
deep sea-bed, all of which are to some degree conflic-
ting. Thus, the Department of State and the 
Administration are still, I regret t33say, pursuing with vigor their "no policy" policy. 
A similar attitude has been taken by the Soviet Union. 
Their policy has been to suggest that the regime be a 
32 Friedheim, Ocean Science, P• 3. 
33Borgese, Pacem in Maribus, p. 231 
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relatively weak organization, and that its creation ·now 
would be a hasty move. The Soviet position is explained by 
Guenter Weissberg: 
Mr. L. I. Mendelevich of the U.s.s.R. took a most 
restrictive attitude on the Maltese ~roposal and on 
the u.s. Plan. After expressing certain platitudesi 
he termed the very establishment of the Comwittee 
on the oceans "very risky" -and 11 premature."..i4 
Ambassador Hendelevich's stand was praised by the represen-
tative J'rom Austral,~a, Weissberg suggests rJhy. 
, .. , .. Australia, with a continental shelf of over one 
mflt;t,.on square miles and a govern.ment which has 
authorized extensive exploration and exploitation 
of the.oil and gas of the_ shelf', praised the ncautious 
wisdom" of Ambassador Mendelevich~ a.nd r·egarded his 
"warning" against prematur:fJ and ill-advised duplication 
as 1ttimely and relevant. n.>.::> 
The developing nations, on the other hand, have been• 
quite anxious to see the regime established with all deli-
bera·te speed. Indeed, it was Arvid Pardo of Malta who, in 
1967, originally submitted a proposal for the creation of an 
ocean regime to the U.N. Genera1Assembly. In Ambassador 
Pardo's statement the importance of immediacy \oJas stressed: 
It is, therefore, considered that the time h~s 
come to declare the sea-bed and the ocean floor a 
common heritage of mankind and that inrraediate steps 
should be taken to draft a treaty ~&bodying, inter 
a.J~~~ the following principles ••• . 
In general, it is the developed countries who ·have 
the upper hand on the proposed sea regime. On the question 
of how soon a regime can be established, matters are at a 
34
vleiss berg, p. 54. 
35weissberg, p. 56. 
36 . . 
U.N. Document A/6695 (1967), p. 1. 
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stendstill since the status quo largely favors the economic 
interests of key developed states. The preponderance of 
oceanographic research and technology adds weight to the 
advantage of the developed nations. 
65 
Developing states have created a hindrance to some 
ocean research efforts by refusing to cooperate with research 
cruises inside their territ6rial waters. Such action adds 
little weight to their political positions. In the area of 
·.~.:,t~~ ;:~.:: 
national jurisdiction at least some developing cotmtrles 
have a v1eapon with which to bargai.n. That weapon is the 200 
mile limit, popularized by Latin f~erican states~ As 
discussed earlier, the "200-mile limit is a sufffcient irri-
tant among some major developed nat~ons that it could bring 
some compromises on the regime, if those with 200-mile limits 
were willing to bargain. There is some evidence to indicate 
that the 200-mile limit states may not be so inclined. On 
the whole then, and not surprisingly, it is the developed 
states who will control to a large extent the timing and 
make up of the new regime. Whether the developing countries 
as a whole will be able to force an adequate form of I'edis-
tribution of o6ean resources is questionable at this time9 
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PART III 
ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS FOR AN OCEAN REGIME 
CHAPTER VI 
POSSIBLE STRUCTURES FOR AN OCEAN REGIME 
Just what kind of organizational status the regime 
should h11ve is an interestJ.ng question. There al"e a number 
of possibilities that should be consideredo It has been 
suggested that the regime take the form of an international 
corporation. 
Professor Richard Eells has proposed that the 
ocean regime take the form of a multinational corporate 
au.thori ty whose stock would be allocated among members · 
of the United Nations according to some formula that 
would assure adequate representation to less developed 
countries. The corporation would need the moral support 
of the United Nations. Stock could ultimately be held 
by governments, foundations, or corporations involved 
.in the oceans, and . these stockholders would elect a 
board of directors to prescribe policies. The cor-
poration vwuld license public or commercial organiza-
tions to use resources of the sea, and it would pay 1 
dividends to its shareholders after meeting its costs. 
Although the idea sounds simplified for the complex 
political problems that a regime would have to deal with, 
the concept merits considerable attention. Supporters of 
the corporation structure maintain that there is evidence to 
concl~de that such arrangements can work. 
To the argument that international organizations 
lack experience in operating enterprises, there is 
the answer that they are already carrying on success-
ful banking and financing operations through the 
International Bank. for Reconstruction and JiJevelopment 
(World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund. 
vfuy should not a. corporate subsidiary of a.n ocean 
1 Burnell, p .. · 4• 
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regime beco2e equally successful in indu~trlal 
operations? 
1-Jhi le it is true that the ~·:ox•ld Bank and the Inter-
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national Monetary Fund are working examples of the structure 
suggested by Professor Eells, one must ask if these organi-
zations could function in a more intense environment of 
political conflict. Certainly the proposed regime carries 
such an environment, but the answer to this question lies 
outside the scope of this paper. It is only mentioned here 
as an interesting possibility. 
A second possible form for the ocean regime is 
proposed by Norman J. Padelford: 
One alternative for coping with maritime issues 
is to utilize the community con_cept as has been developed 
among the six Western-European states who have joined 
to form the Conrrnon Market. The Common Market rests 
upon the principle ·that mutual concern for a particular 
situation or set of problems gives rise, under 
appropriate circumstances, to a sense of con~unity ••• 
Perhaps eventually state~ will be agreeable to 
forming3similar institutions for regulating use of the oceans. . 
The principle of.mutual concern to which Professor Padelford 
refers is basic to the working of any international agreement, 
and it has worked extremely well in the European Economic 
Community. The key to its success is pinpointed by Mr. 
Scheingold when he statest "In its most general form the 
lesson of the Buropean Community is in its capacity as a 
functional regime to concert national policy on matters of 
2 
Burnell, p. ;;. 
3 Padelford, p~ 272. 
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real economic ~lv!porte.nce. 11 Mutual concern and a concert of 
national goals is exactly Hhat is needed for an international 
regime to control ocean resources. These elements are to be 
.found in the st:r•uc tui•e of the European Corrummi ty. The rJOrld 
community, on the other hand, simply does not share the same 
common ground that the European Community has been able to 
build. Indeed, an analogy between the 't'lOrld ,community and 
Europe must leave one a little cold. 
The European Community vJa.s created ou:t of a widely 
shared sense of common crisis. At the cl.ose of World 
War II much of Europe lay in ruins; the poli.tical 
systems of the individual states \>mre in shambles; and 
confidence in the nation-state as a source of security, 
welfare and d§mocratic values was, to say the least, 
badly shaken • .? 
While the success of the European C_ormnunity should serve as 
an inspiration to those working for an effective regime of 
the se~, its particular situation has little relevance. 
Thirdly, we must ask what relationship should the 
ocean regime have to the United Nations?. Clearly to tie it 
directly to a U.N. organ such as the Security Councll or the 
General Assembly or both would not works '11hese organs have 
developed the function, inter alia, of an international 
sounding-board. If they were given direct responDibility 
for the ocean regime, its functioning vJould become secondary 
to international rhetoric a.nd political shifting. 
There are many U.N. subsidiary organizations that 
have functions defined in separate agreements.. The Report of 
4P..orgese, Pacem_ln .M.~ibu.s, p. 215 ... 
.5Borgese, Pacem in Mar:i.bu~, p. 219. 
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the Sea-Bed Committee cites some examples: 
A number of United Nations' subsidlary organs 
perform functions which are defined in international 
agreements, particular examples being the bodies 
concerned with narcotic drugs and the Offlce of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
In the case of the Office of UNHCR, the Office was 
created by the General Assemgly and given functions . 
under a separate convention. · 
The ocean regime should be functionally separated 
from the United Nations but it should also hold·a relation-
ship to it. Elisabeth Borgese has expressed this view by 
saying:· 
The regime must be independent from the United 
Nations--like the World Bank or the International 
Atomic Energy Agency--yet it must be in someway 
connected with it; it7must emanate from it; it must be legitimized by it. 
The U.,N. blessing should be encouraged if for no other 
reason than to help enhance the universality of acceptance 
for the ocean regime. 
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What organizational substructure should the ocean 
regime have? "The Study on-International Machineryn makes 
the .following observation in regard to the regime's structure: 
The organization would have an organ in which all 
the members would be represented, whose purposes would 
be to establish policy and give direction to the . 
organization; an organ of more restricted membership 
to examine, recommend or decide on questions of 
granting of licenses ••• possibly one or more technical 
or scientific organs of an advisory nature; and a 
secretariat. An organ designed to hage some functions 
in respect of settlement of disputes. 
6 U.N. Document A/7622 (1970), p. 123. 
7Borgese, TQli~~d an .~nternational Ocean Regim~, 
P• 229. 
8 U.N. Document A/AC 138/23, (1970), p. 32. 
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Most of the regime proposals have adopted this design. 
Basically, the suggested structure is patterned after that of 
the United Nations. Organs resembling the General .Assembly, 
Security Council, Secretariat, International Court of Justice 
and the Specialized Agencies appear in virtually all the 
proposed regimes. Such an arrangement, reflecting the 
structural pattern of the U.N.,makes sense because it is 
one that all nations are familiar with and somewhat com-
fortable about. The assembly should provide for even 
geographical distribution of its membership. Elisabeth 
Borgese has suggested that the assembly consist of four 
chambers, one for repr~sentatives from nation-states, one for 
representatives from the international mining corporations, 
one for fishing organizatlons and one for sc·ientis ts. Whlle 
the idea of including representatives from cownercial and 
scientific interests is an excellent one and should be 
utilized, it would not be wise to allow them, collectively, 
to dominate the assembly's membership. An assembly with a 
broad geographical and political cross-sectlon that also 
includes representatives from related interests, but in 
smaller proportions than to nation-states, would be more 
acceptable. 
The council or executive board, as the Russians have 
called it, should represent by permanent membership the most 
developed countries. ~t should also provide for membership 
of the var•ious interest group nations, i.e. land-locked and 
shelf-locked states as well as coastal de~ef.oping countries. 
The Russian draft ... ca.lls for an Executive Board of the 
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foll.ol-1ing- composition: 
The executive Board shall consist of thirty States. 
-The Board shall accordingly include five states from 
each of the following group~ of countries: 
a. the Socialist countries; 
b. the countries of Asia; 
c. the countries of Afr:I.ca; 
d. the countries of Latin America; 
e. the western European and other countries not coming 
within the categories specified in sub-paragraphs 
(a) to (d) of this paragraph and; 
f. one land-locked country frof1 each of the afore-
mentioned groups of States. 
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While this adequately provides for a good geographi ... 
cal distribution and for land-locked representation, it is 
def'initely weighted toward Russian interests. Clearly, if 
six socialist countries are present at least one of them would 
reflect Soviet interests; on the other hand, it would be 
entirely possible that u.s. interests under this arrangement 
would go unrepresented. 
The U.S·. draft contains a more realistic proposal. 
Article 36 reads: 
2. Members of the Council shall be deslgnated or 
elected in the following categories: 
a. The six most industrially advanced Contracting 
Parties shall be designated in accordance with 
Appendix E; 
b. Eighteen additional Contracting Parties, of whtch 
at least twelve shall be developing countries, 
shall be elected by the Assembly, taking into acc£bmt 
the need for equitable geographical distribution. 
The most industrially advanced nations referred to 
in Article 36 would be determined by the six highest gross 
9 U.N. Docwnent A/AC 138/43, p. ?. 
10 . ~~£2!~ by the Special Sub-committee qg_92te~ 
Continental Shelf, p. 77. 
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national products. Thus both su.perpowers would be perma-
nently represented• 
The exact membership of the court and secretariat is 
not dealt with extensively by the various drafts, although 
they do generally suggest equitable geographical distribution. 
The application of this principle to the staf~ing of the 
secretariat raises the question of quality in regard to 
secretariat personnel. 
Because the secretariat of' an ocean regime should be 
of high quality and because the type of background that 
would be required is not likely. to be common, it would seem 
impossible to have both a quality staffing of the secretariat 
and equal geographical distribution.. Richard Symonds in an 
article enti.tled "li1unctional Agencies and International 
Administration", has summed up the problem thus: 
The reality of 'equitable geographical distribution' 
in recruitment has to be faced. Its application has led 
to a decline in standards, but member staiis are likely 
to continue to insist. on its a.pplication .. 
· Since the council of the proposed regime is, in 
almost all the draft, statutes, the focus of power and 
decision-making, its voting procedure :l.s critical. Evan 
Laurd has noted this and offered a solution: 
More difficult problems surround the nature of 
the international regime. First, the authority clearly 
cannot be established on the.basis of majority voting 
a.nd one nation-one vote {if only because the big 
powers would not enter at all on this basis); but nor 
should any nation or small group of them (as under the 
U.S. proposal) exercise a veto~ The simplest solution 
is to have a council of perhaps 30 nations, elected 
on the basis of geographic representation, and including 
11 Jordan, P• 113. 
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adequate representation for non-coastal states, and to 
require, say, a four-fifths majority for .any dec;l.sion. 
This would maximize12onsensus without allow:i.ng vetoes 
or weighting votes. 
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The elimination of the veto as suggested above seems 
to be an honorable goal. However, the suggested solution 
cited above will not do. Any body that does not insure, not 
only the represe~tation of the superpowers but also the 
serving of their interests, will eventually fail. If, for 
example, the council of 30 nations were to make a decision 
directly in conflict \>lith Soviet interests, the USSR could 
simply refuse to comply. If the Soviet Union (or any other 
major power) in such an instance decided to leave the regime 
and car•ry on exploitation activities as a. non-member state, 
the ver·y purpose of the regime would be defeated. One might 
reply that dtte to the required four-fifths majority the 
interests of the major powers would not be contra.dictedo 
One should then ask what is· the difference between this 
proposal and a system including a veto for major powers~ 
While the USSR draft calls for what amounts to a:veto 
\ 
for all members, the u.s. proposal establishes a system under · 
which any three major powers could by voting together, 
exercise a veto. Article 23 of the Russian draft reads: 
of 
on 
of 
Decisions of the Executive Board on questions 
substance shall be made by agreement; decisions 
procedural questions shall be made by the ma.:tority 
the mem.ber•s of the Board present and voting. ,; 
While Article 38 of the u.s. working paper states: "Decisions 
12 . 
Laurd, p. 145. 
13 U.N. Document A/AC 138/43, P• 8. 
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by the Council shall require approval by a majority of all 
ita members, including a majority of members in each of the 
14 
two categories referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 36. 11 
In the u.s. draft a majority of the first category of six 
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members is four, thus three can veto. It seems unlikely that 
·a council without some form of veto for the·major powers 
would.be universally accepted .. 
The problem of financing the ocean regime is a 
critical part of its structural setup. There are a great 
many monetary possibilities. It is, however, too early to 
predict with any accuracy which method will best fulfill the 
political needs present at the time the ftnancial decision 
is made. If the new regime follows existing patterns for 
financing UN organi.zations, several options are available. 
Existing UN ol~ganization are normally financed by one 
of the following three methods: 
1. All expenses are provided for in the regular UN 
budget, e.g. UNCTAD, 
2. All expenses·a:re bol"'ne by voluntary contributions, 
e.g. UNITAR and UNICEF, 
3. The organization is financed by both the UN and 
voluntary contribution, e.g. UNIDO and UNHCR. 
However, the specialized agencies in the UN follow a 
separate route. Each agency makes-up its own annual budget, 
and this is then repor.ted to the General Assembly for 
14 R~port by the S.Pe.ci.al Sub-cs_~1~tt~~-9..n Out~ 
Continental Shelf, p. 78. 
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recommendations.. Each agency has a separate financial 
agreement with the UN differing in v~rious degrees. In case 
of IBRD and IMF, hmvever, the UN has no control over the 
agency budgets and the appropriate authorities enjoy full 
autonomy in decid1.ng the form and content or the budget. Both 
IBRD and IMF are financially self sufficient organizations. 
As we have already seen,existing structural patterns 
will probably hold little relevance to .the proposed regime 
due to its unique character and indicated function. As a 
result, some nations have suggested new methods of financing 
the regime. For example, Tanzania has proposed the following: 
1. Initial costs will be borne by the members of 
the Authority according to the scales established 
by the executive council, 
2. Income received in excess of administrative and 
other costs will be distributed equitably by the 
Assembly to the member states. 15 
Similar financial arrangements have been proposed by 
Canada, Poland, and others. The United Kingdom, for example, 
16 
has suggested t.hat the authority should be self-financing. 
Underlying the,.above suggestions for financing the regime is 
the assumption that the regime 'will control, to some degree 
at least, a sizable amount of wealth in ocean resources. 
this assumption is correct, one of. the regime's major 
functions will be to redistribute therevenue gained from 
If 
ocean resources. This particular.function.is considered in· 
15u .N. Document A/ AC 138/33 ( 1971.) • 
16u .N. Document A/ AC 138/46 (1971) • 
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greater detail in the following chapter. However, an addi-
···-, ... 
tional question is~ to what other uses should regime receipts 
be put? There have been three main suggestions. 'I'hey are: 
1. A proportion of the revenue should be reserved 
for projects which contribute to the development 
i 
of the sea-bed as the common heritage of mankind. 
2. Conservation schemes and projects sponsored by. 
regional offices of the Authority. 
) •. Due regard for training personnel and allocating 
revenue for underdeveloped nations should be 
given. 
The appropriate financial arrangement will depend 
upon the functions and powers deleg.ated to the regime •. 
Optimistically, it is hoped .that th(1 regime can be self-
suff-icient. If properly arranged revenues ~rom licensing, 
royalties, and membership dues and/or contributions will 
provide adequate monetary resources. Finally, and somewhat 
idealistically, it is hoped that some significant amount of 
economic redistribution can be maintained to compensate those 
developing states· whose economics may be jeopardized by a 
flood of ocean minerals. 
The importance of a constructive agreement on an 
ocean regime has led some observers to look for analogous 
~--­
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patterns .in the form of existing treaties. Two treaties offer "i' === 
limited relevance t·o a new regime of the sea. They are the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Treaty Governing Exploration 
of Outer Space, 1966. · Eoth treaties attempt to form mutually 
.acceptable patterns of national behavior in areas lacking 
78 
sovereign territorial claimse ·aoth treatie~ provide for 
peaceful uses, a prohibition on nuclear arms and cooperation 
in, and freedom of, scientific research. Beyond the points 
mentioned above however, these treaties offer little guidance 
for an ocean regime. 
The Antarctic Treaty is based upon the territorial 
principle of res'nullius, (territory belonging to no one) and 
as such the Antarctic is still available for claims of 
territoriality through prescription or othe:P legal means. 
Applied to the oceans the principle of ~~~~ would 
escalate the possibility of conflict. Such an approach to 
the territoriality of the sea has not been seriously 
suggested since the seventeenth century when Hugo Grotius and 
John Seldon staged thei.r classic debate over the law of ·the 
sea. Grotius proposed a doctrine of ~ (free sea) 
while Seldon proposed mare clausu.m (closed sea). Grotius 1 
mare liberum was the forerunner of the modern freedom of the 
seas doctrine. 
The Outer Space Treaty, as opposed to the Antarctic 
Treaty, is based on the principle of~ (territory 
owned by all nations). This principle does create an analo-
gous situation to the ocean regime. Proposals for the regime · 
have all been based on the concept of res communis for ocean-
space beyond national jurisdiction. The phrase which is 
widely employed in draft treaties for the ocean a.nd embodies 
the res comm~ idea is the "common heritage" principle. 
rrhe similarities and differences between the 
· Antarctic and Space Treaties and the proposed ocean regime 
~ 
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are however superficial. The proposed regime is a unique 
and fundamente.lly new a tt.empt in interna tion~.l relations. 
The regime proposals suggest establishing internatibnal 
machinery to control and distribute natural resources, a 
79 
runction which is a long stride beyond res communis. Because 
the regime is a new and unique idea there is no point in 
trying to find workable patterns for it in past international 
agreements. The "international ship of' state" must sail into 
unchartered waters to reach agreement on a meaningful regime, 
its captain cannot steer a true course by consulting a map 
of outer space. 
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CHAPTER VII 
FUNCTIONS AND PO\-iEHS OF THE REGIVili 
The proposal to establish an international regime to 
control the resources of the sea-bed beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction has virtually universal support from 
the nations of the world. There is general agreement on 
many basic principles upon which such a regime should be 
founded. The principles· enjoying a general consensus include: 
the use of the sea-bed fo~ peaceful purposes, using sea-bed 
resources for the benefit of mankind, allowing freedom of 
scientific research, maintaining the freedom of the high seas, 
and prevention and control of pollution. To assume a true 
consensus based on this ostensible homogeneity is to be 
misled. The attempted application of these principles in 
various draft proposals has uncovered a list of controversial 
issues centered around the possible functions and poto1ers of 
an ocean regime. Three issues have been sele.cted for 
discussion= the extent of the regime's power, the financial 
powers of collecting and redistributing money, and finally 
the role of enforcement in the settlement of disputeso 
'!'he Sea-Bed Committee in a. report ?alled "Study on 
1 
International Machiner!'' lists· four possible types of 
internationalmachinery. Varying in power from weakest to 
1 
U.N. Document (A/AC 138/23), p. 17. 
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strongest they are: (1) international machinery for exchange 
of information and preparation of studies; (2) international 
machinery with intermediate pov.Jers; (J) international machin-
ery for registration~d ·licensing; and (4) international 
machinery having comprehensive powers. By process of. 
elimination the above list can be narrowed quick1y. The 
grant of' power Ul'lder ( 1) and ( 2) is too weak to consider the 
machinery a regime at all. ~~he proposal under (4), machinery 
having comprehensive powers, would include the power of the 
organization to engage in direct exploitation activities. 
Unfortunately, such a. regime is currently politically 
impossible, since no major nation supports it. Mr. Vincent 
McKelvey, U oS. representative to the Sea-Bed Committee, made 
the followlng statement before the Committee:-
Our debate .has also b~ought out so~e s~ggested 
forms and functions of international machinery that 
my Government does not believe vJOuld serve our funda~ 
mental objectives of developing sea-bed· resources for 
the benefit of all manklnd. I refer in particular 
to the suggestions that sea-bed exploration ou~ht to 
be .undertaken b2 an international operating 
organization ••• 
Thus, we are left with the third alternative, a 
system f'or registration and licensing. Most of the draft 
proposals assume this level of power for the international 
~egime. Senator ~ell's proposal calls for a licensing 
authority designated by the United Nations with the approval 
of the Security Council. Such an arra.ngement would clearly 
reflect the political realities involved, but it is likely 
2 
"August Session of U.N. Sea-bed Committee Held at 
New Yot•k," The Department of St8te Bulletln, LXI (September, 
1967), P• 2"86; 
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that this direct tie-irt with the U.N. would encourage the 
use of the licensing system a.s a "political i'ootbe.ll." A 
separate system not tied directly to-the United Nations or 
the Security Council might avoid s~ch a problem. 
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The u.s .. working paper calls for the esta.blislunent of 
a trusteeship to control registration and licensing in the 
·area between the limits of national jurisdiction and the end 
of the continental margin. Basically th:is means the coastal 
state will control the licensing in this area. Beyond the 
truste~~hip zone the Lnternational ~ea-Bed Resource Authority 
(ISRA) would control licensing. However, the ISRA cannot 
bypass national control completely and carry on exploitation 
on their own. Appendix A of the u.s. draft proposal outlines 
the procedures for obtaining an exploitation license. In all 
cases private companies must work through an "Authorizing or 
Sponsoring Party 11 which would be a national government by 
definition.3 This procedui•e amounts to a system of "double 
concession" which is defined in the "Study on International 
Machinery. 11 
It was suggested that a double conc~ssion system 
might be established, so that the ·international 
authority would grant licenses to a State which would 
act as a sort of "administering a.uthority 11 in respect 
of the sublipenses they might in tur•n grant to 
enterprises.4-
This approach has been.strongly criticized by Evan 
Laurd. 
3Re12.ort 'l?~~he Special Sub-comrni ttee on Outer 
Gontinentil Shelf,!). 71: 
4u.N. Document A/AC 138/23, p. 37. 
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It is widely assumed that licensing tV'ill be direct 
to goverrnnen.ts, Hh.tch 1t1i 11 then themsel ve:s license 
companies.. r.i:J:lls 'reflects the fact that i.t iS govern-
ments' that are deciding the question. Butt it is in 
f'a.ct the wcr . .st posstble system. It would provide a 
multiplicity .of separate regulations and juri~dictions 
in a peculiar patch\-Jork all over the sea-bed.--' 
Elisabeth Borgese, in hel"' proposed draf't, suggests 
direct licenslng from the regime authority to "Nember States•" 
and to international organizations and corporations. This 
direct procedure would be superior to a system of double 
concession. 
Again; unfortunately, a direct l:tcens.ing procedure 
does not seem politically feasible at this time. Despite the 
fact that the major pol-Jers are \·Jilling tel renounce any claim 
by a nation-state to any part of the deep sea-bed area, still 
they are unv1illing to allow an international regime to assume 
sovereign control. As Norman J. Padelford has observed: 
Thus :rar neither the United States nor other 
principal powers. are convinced that control of the 
seas should be conferred upon an international body. 
Nor are they ready to endow an organization with 
supra-national authority to dictate marine activi-
ties. Enlightened conceptions of ngtional interest 
remain the surest guide for policy. 
This reluctance seems almost contradictory with the 
articles proposed by major powers renouncing sovereign 
claims. For example the Russian draft Article 5 st.ates: 
No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or 
sovereign rights over any part of the sea-bed or the 
sub-soil thereof. States Parties to this Treaty 
shall not recognize any such claim or exercise of 
sovereignty or sovereign rights. 
5 
Laurd, p. 145. 
6 .. 
Padelford, P• 273. 
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Similiarly, the sea-bed and the sub-soil thereof 
shall not be subject to appropriation by any7means, · by States or persons, natural or juridi.cial. . 
while the u.s. draft states: 
No State may claim or exercise sovereignty or 
sovereign rights over any part of the International 
Sea-bed Area or its resources. Each Contracting 
Party agrees not to recognize any such claim8or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights. 
Yet u.s. Representative, John Stevenson, made the followipg 
statement before· the Sea-bed Committee: 
Accordingly, we believe it is important to dispel 
any possible misconceptions that my government would 
agree to a monopoly by an international operating 
agency over deep sea-bed exploitation or to any type 
of economic zone that does .not accommodate bas.ic · 
United States interest~ with respect to resources 
as well as navigation. 
Indeed·it will be difficult. enough f'or the u.s. 
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adm:i.nistration to continue to support its own proposal, in 
light of Congressional.disa.pproval, let alone attempting to 
suggest an increase in power for a proposed regime& Ih 
hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, the regime was referred to as "a sort of floating 
10 Chinese pagoda." The reason some Senators objected is due 
to domestic pressures, primarily from the hard mineral mining 
companies. 
In the final analysis the extent of the international 
7
u.N. Document A/AC 138/43, p. 2. 
8 
Report by tH~Special Sub-corr~ittee on Outer 
Continental Shelf, p. 71. 
9
u.N. Document A/7622, P• 383. 
10 Report by the Special Sub-committee on Outer 
·Co.ntinental_§he1,£, p. 2.5. 
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regime's power will depend more on its universality of 
acceptance than any specific licensing procedure. A non-
8.5 
member state would not be bound by the treaty establishing a 
regime. "Assuming that a particular State did not' accept 
any rights or obligations under the treaty, its activities 
11 
would be based on existing customary and conventional law." 
And it is the inadequacy of the existing customary and 
conventional law that makes the proposed regime desirable and 
necessary. 
· The second issue for discussion is that of the 
financial pot-Jer of the proposed regime both for collecting 
· f'unds and redistributing them. The collect. ion of funds for 
the regime authority could come.from a number of different 
soul'•ces. The U.s. draft has explored this area in some 
deta·il. It sugg"'sts one, a license fee of f:t'om $5,000 to 
$15,000 per block of exploitable area (of which a portion 
between one half and two thirds would be forwarded to the 
· ISRA); two, a rental fee beginning in the third year after a 
licens.e is given and prior to commercial production; three, 
payments on production including a $500 1 000 to $2,000,000 
bonus payment. Thus, resource exploiters, under the u.s. 
dl"aft would pay license, rental, and royalty fees. Such a 
system would produce considerable income for the regime. 
The concept of graduated jurisdiction discussed in 
Chapter V and proposed. in the u.s. draft in the form of zones 
of waning national control, will help in the system of 
11u.N. Document A/7622, p. 161. 
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collectlon and redist.ribLttion of funds. This advantage is 
succinctly described by Evan Laurd~ 
Harder still are the questions relating to the 
scale of royalties and the system of redistribution. 
There is a lot to be said for the intermediate zone 
system suggested by the United States and Malta. 
This zone might stretch from 50 to 100 mi.les from 
the coast~ in it the coastal state would retain some 
degree of control but would pay a considerable part 
of the royalties to the international authority. 
The effect is to reduce.the sharp division between 
the national and the international area. This lessens 
conflicts on boundaries by asking coastal states to 
share resou1"es, rather than to forego them 
altogether~ ' . · 
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Under the trusteeship arrangement the ISRA would 
receive a substantial part of the proceeds from the trustee~ 
·ship area. The actual percentage is suggested at betl-Jeen 
50% and 66 2/3% of the total. The proposed syste~ of 
.collection and redistribution presented in the UGSs working 
paper is the most specific guide suggested to date.· 
The i'inal issue to be discussed is the role of 
enforcement in the settlement of disputes related to the 
proposed lnternational regime. ·Most of the proposals 
include some form of organization to settle disputes. The 
Pell proposal provides for a review panel to hear the dispute 
with the possibility of appeal to the International Court of 
Justice. The u.s. draft calls for a tribunal of final 
jurisdictlon. Whatever the structure, the key question is 
what type of enforcement can be used? Senator Pell has 
called for the establishment of a Sea Guard, under the 
control of the Security Council. The Sea Guard is described 
·-- 12 
Laurd, p. 145. 
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in the following terms:: · 
In order to promote the objectives and ensure the 
observance of the provisio.ns set forth in this Treaty, 
States Parties to the Treaty agree that there shall 
be established as a. nermanent force a Sea Guard of 
the United Nations which rnay take such action as may 
be necessary to maintain and enforce international 
compliance ~-Jith these principles ••• The Sea Guard shall 
be under the co~ijrol of the Security Council of the 
United Nations.·J · 
Enforcement under this suggestion 140uld rest on the 
workability of and principle of collective security in the 
Security Council. This has been demonstrated to be more a 
matter of selective security than a reliable form of enforce ... 
ment: 
If a Contracting Party fails to perform the 
obligations incumbent upon it under a jud~nent 
rendered by the Tribunal, the other Party to the case 
may have recoLlrse to the Council, which shall decide 
upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judg-
ment. Wnen appropriate,· the Council may decide to 
suspend temporarily, in whole or in part, the rights 
undez> this Convention of the Party failing to perform 
its obligations, withoLlt ;impairing the rights of 
licensees who have not contributed to the failure to 
perform such obligations. The extent of such a 
suspension should be related fP. the extent and 
seriousness of the violation. 4 
The pz>oblem is, of course, that once a member state's 
rights were suspended, no reason would exist for him to honor 
the treaty obligationso Thus, he could easily justify 
defiance of the treaty,as a non-member state. The u.s. 
working paper has no suggestions foz> enforcing treaty 
obligations on non-member states. · This reinforces the 
13congressional Recoz>d• CXIV, :p. 5184. 
· 
1~eport b;;c the Special SLlb-committee __££! Oq~~ 
Continental Shelf, p. 62 •. · 
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importance of universal acceptance ofwhatever treaty is 
finally drafted. This is noted in the "Study on Inter-· 
national Machinery": 
It would hardly be poss:tble from a legal stand-
point to enforce decisions of the international 
machinery Y..~~-:a-v1:_~ third States. Even if the 
concept of the establishment of an 'objective regime' 
were generally accepted, there would be practical 
difficulties,as regards those States which did not 
agree to the applicability of the concept. The 
possibility of the use of force with respect to such 
States should be excluded •••• In order, therefore 1 
to ensure fully effective functioning of international 
machinery of the type in question, it would be highly 
important; to ensure uni ve1ga1 participation in the 
regime to be established. . 
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Enforcement of a treaty to establish a regime· to 
·control the resources of the sea beyond national jurisdiction 
·will have to depend upon.the principle of reciprocity like 
any other international agreement. 
An additionalproblem related to enforcement concerns 
the need for some form of control over multinational corpora-
tions that have financial interests in ocean resources. 
· This need should be of obvious importance since large 
corporatlons 1 such as the Hughe·s Tool Company, are developing 
the capability of exploiting manganese nodules, while the 
large oil companies are becoming increasingly interested in 
off'sho1•e oil deposits. It was concern over premature 
exploitation of ocean wealth that led to the Moritorium 
Resolution discussed earlier. 
It see1ns clear that unrestricted exploitation of sea. 
minerals without some international agreement of regulation 
l5u.N. Document A/AC 1.38/23, p. 62. 
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is undesirable. Even after a regime is established multi-· 
national industries are likely to cause problems. Almost all 
enforcement clauses in the current draft proposals deal 
directly Hith nation-states,· assuming that the nation-states 
will, in turn, control their own private industry.; However, 
large corporations which are international in scope may well 
elude such control by ·shifting their base of operations to 
the country or countries most amiable to their· wishes to 
exploit ocean resources. This type of industrial competition 
could undermine the entire regimeo 
Indee¢1 the problem of competition among developtng 
states for foreign investment is not a new one·to the inter"' 
national community. 
It must be remembered that although a host country 
has the right to be as strict as it considers appropriate 
\-Jhen a multinational corporation operates in its 
territory, it cannot force a multinational corporation 
to locate its activities there. The key consideration 
is that there are often other countries vJhich are eager 
to offer more attractive conditions. Indeed, in a 
number of countries, especially those vJi th a federal 
form of government, various loca~ and provincial 
authorities outbid one anotherol 
If these problems exist in a system of clearly defined 
national boundaries they can ·only be intensified vJhen related 
to the sea regime and the uncertainty that surrounds national 
ownership of ocean resources. 
The most significant concern related to multinational 
corporations and the ocean regime is the possibility that, 
16 
"Report on Multinational Corporations in World 
Development," International Legal Material~, XII (September, 
1973), P• 1130. 
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due to the unique and disputed jurisdictional. situation of 
the sea regime, corporations may develop th~t are supra-
national in character. A recent study published in 
International LE;3gal Materi~~- ha~ addressed this conce1 .. n. 
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Recent proposals for the creat:ton of an international· 
authority for the regulation or exploration of resources 
of the sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion indicatE] further poss:lbilities for the creation of 
supranational machinery~ These proposals also indicate 
difficult problems of control. rrhe pending negotiations 
with l~espect to the sea-bed \vould thus thrm¥ light o~ 
possible arrangements concerning the creation of 
supra~~tional corpo1•ations or machinery dealing with 
them. 1 · 
Although a full discussion of the special problems 
posed by multinational corporations is beyond the scope of 
this thesis it is important to note the signi.ficance of the 
situation. The existence of such industry and the increasing 
three.t of full scale exploitation of ocean wealth is 
multiplying the n.eed for rapid agreement by the international 
con~unity on a workable ocean regime to avoid the possibility 
of conflict. It also calls for careful preparation in 
drafting the agreement for an ocean regime. The regime must 
make allo't-Jances for and be able to deal with the problems 
posed by multinational corporations. 
The various proposals fox• the establishment of an 
ocean regime have provided an interesting and informative 
backdrop on which to consider the political feasibility of 
such a regime. Currently the regime faces stalling tactics 
on the part of many nations who are uncertain that 
----------------17rnte~national.Legal Materials, p. 1126. 
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international regulation now would be to their economic 
advantage. Thus, there is cause for pessimism. Everyone 
recognizes that frantic, uncontrolled exploitation of ocean 
resources would be a detriment to all, but many wish to wait 
until the situation gets worse before they act. Arvid Pardo 
has commented: 
International management of the oceans and the:l.r 
resources may be necessary in the interests of all; 
but, until present chaos is further eompounded, unt:i.l 
ocean living resources are seen globally to become 
scarcer, and until the ecology of the oceans is 
visibly a.nd gravely impaired over the greater part 
of our planet, it is .to be feared that states will 
prefer to continue lJi th the present system, seeking 
to mitigate the negative effects of absence of 
authol .. ity and uncontrolled use by bringing er.sr wider 
areas of the seas under national reg1,;1lation. · 
Of the various proposals presented the UoS. draft· is 
the most detailed and ~ealistic. It provides for a- structure 
patterned after the United Nations. It also has prescribed 
a fairly realistic set of functions and powers to that 
structure. It has utilized, through the trusteeship idea, 
the concept of graduated jurisdiction vJhich will be essential 
to the success of an ocean regime. One·must ask, what is the 
possibility of near universal acceptance of the u.s. draft? 
Apparently the outlook is gloomy. John Frohnmayer reports on 
the Pacem in Maribu~ Convocation:: 
'l'he Pacem in Haribus Convocation at Halta in the 
fall of 1970 provided a forum for some of the first 
national reactions to the Nixon Proposal. None of the 
fifty-one nations represented at the convocation 
expressed support for the proposal, and Dr. Ebrgese 
18 Arvid Pardo, "Development of Ocean Space -- An 
International Dilemma,'' Louisiana La1t~ .. R..£.Yif?_'!, XXXI ( 1970-71), 
. P• 52. 
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conc1udei·that if the reaction of these nations 
serves as a barometer, the Nixon Proposal has litt1!9 chance of effective support in the world community. 
19 . John E. Frolmmayer, "The Nixon P~oposa1 for an 
International Sea-bed Authority'', Oregon Law R~view L 
(October, 1971), p. 616. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this thesis two sets of related 
conflicts were discussed: the struggle between man and his 
environment and the struggle among nations. The movement to 
establish a regime to participate in the allocation of ocean 
resources among nations reflects both struggles. In the 
first case, modern society has become increasingly dependent 
upon raw materials and inexpensive fossil fuels. The ocean 
offers the last untapped reservoir of .these resources. 
Historical patterns of ~xplbitation of natural resources 
have· sho1-m the underlying assumption that ra-vJ materials are 
inexhaustible. The oceans have been called the "last 
frontier", and it is perhaps from this facade that ocean 
wealth may be considered inexhaustible, just as fresh land 
once seemed endless during the westward movement of American 
·history. However, maritime reserves t-Jill not be omnipresent 
if rapidly and wastefully exploi.ted. The following quotation 
provides a stirring perspective from which to view the 
longevity of resources from our "last frontier": 
The seas seem immense, and it is sobering to view 
them as did Jacques Cousteau at ·a recent meeting of 
students, when he pointed out that if the earth were 
to be viewed as the size of an egg, all the oceans 
taken together would constitute only a single drop, 
which then would be spread over three-fourths of the 
egg's surface. In that light, we have come to realize 
that the oceans, a vital life-preserving resource 
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essential to existence~ ar~ not inexhaustible. 
Mankind is challenged to ma.."'<inlize the potential· of 
ocean resources without evaporating them before viable 
alternatives can be found to fossil fuels and other 
94 
diminishing reserves. Such is the problem of man's struggle 
with his environment. 
Supex•imposed upon this struggle is a second one, that 
of conflicting interests among nations. Eefore man can 
intelligently deal with ocean resources he must first deal 
with the international problems involved. Thus, an inter-
national reg:i.me to distribute maritime wealth must depend 
upon a relaxation of the struggle among nations before it can 
ef:f'ectively obtain its primary goal of peacefully allocating 
resources. A method through which f.J. lessening of global 
t;ens'ions might be achieved :i.s by affecting the political 
compromises necessary to establishing a vJOrkable regime that 
would be uni veJ.~sal in ~cope and based on some form of reci-
procity. Unless some form of progress is made toward 
resolvlng the·environmental and international struggles 
facing uS today the future may hold a host of undesirable . 
l"epercussions. 
Hoping to prevent conflict over ocean uses and 
resources the United Nations is sponsoring the third Con-
:f'erence on the Law of the Sea. rl'he Conference is scheduled 
to begin substantive sessions on June 20, 1974 in Caracas, 
1
'l'homas A. Clingan, Jr., "Organizing to Probe the 
Oceans; An. Exercise ln Political Science," Ore_gon _!.aw Review, 
L (October, 1971), p. 398. 
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Venezuela. The agenda for the Conference will be a long one, 
some items are of minor i.mportance others could have the 
impact of ttmaking or breaking'• the proposed ocean regime. 
More important, ho\vever, than the specific i.tems of the agenda 
are several key issues upon \-Jhich the Confer•ence 1 S 1 success 
will hinge. The context and significa.nce of: many of these 
issues has already been discussed ln :the body of this thesis. 
In the present discussion a summation of these issues is 
attempted.. 1'he more crucial issues wlll be presented here 
and evaluated as to theil• overall impact upon the ocean 
regime and the probability of their success at the coming IJaw 
of the Sea Conference. Five major issues have been selected 
~or discussion. 
The first issue is the determination of the limits of 
national jurisdiction. Perhaps the most important issue, the 
decision reached on the quest~on of national maritime boun-
daries will affect virtually every other phase and issue of 
the conference. The exact limits agreed upon at the Con-
ference, if any, will, in effect, directly determine the 
amount of power an ocean regime will have. The primary 
reason for this is that in determining the extent of national 
ocean boundaries one also allocates ocean resources. It 
should be recalled from the discussion in Chapter V that the 
amount of ocean wealth is indirectly proportional to the 
distance from the shore. This is particularly true of 
nation~ with long continental margins. 
Although comprising only about 25 percent of the 
world's total underwater terrain, theie margins are 
of' irn.rilense significance, particularly the inne~ 
~-------~ 
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regions of the shelves and slopes, for all coastai 
and maritime interests~ Some 80 percent of all 
commercial fish swim there. Nearly all potential 
hydrocarbon resom~ces are loca.ted in margin deposits, 
leaving only the nodules and highly migratory fish 
as comrne2cially attractive r•esources beyond the 
margins. • 
In addltion territorial and economic botmdaries will affect 
·-······-···"· milita~y-'- scie11tific and commercial uses of the sea.···rrhese 
-- ........ -.------·-. 
problems are, however, more directly related to the second 
issue which will be analyzed later. 
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Actual proposals that will certainly be presented at 
the Conference range from territorial limits of from 12 to 
200 miles. ':(.lhe 200-mile limit with full sovereign control 
by the coastal state is being pushed the hardest by several 
Latin .American states. They are not alone, however, and have 
been joined by both developed and developing nations who 
favor the 200-mile limit. The Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, is proposing a 12 mile limit with an extended economic 
zone for minerals of the continental margin. 
The Soviet Union is proposing that coastal states 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over mineral resources 
.out to the point where their margins reach depths of' 
500 meters or out to 100 miles, whichever is greater. 
This solution favors countries with wide, relatively 
shallo\oJ margins--like the Soviet Union, whose margin 
area extends outt..Jard many hundreds of miles--but still 
leaves some margin resources around the world outside 
the exclusive control o~ coastal states.J 
The United States favors a 12 mile limit, if free transit is 
guaranteed, and an economic resource area that could extend 
2 Seyom Brown and Larry L. Fabian, "Diplomats at Sea," 
roreign Affairs, LII (January, 1974), P• 303o 
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Brown, p. 307. 
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to 200 miles from shore. There are, of course, almost as 
many different suggestions as there are natiCons, however it 
seems clear that some extension of coastal jurisdiction is 
imminento 
It is this au thor's vi€rtoJ that, if an ~agreement is 
reached on the limits of national jurisdiction, it will 
involve some system of graduated jurisdiction., That is, .a 
system of gradually lessening coastal state "Control. That a 
new territorial limit of at least 12 miles~ ~ith full 
sovereign rights for the coastal state, will emerge is almost 
certain. Beyond 12 miles there is likely to be established 
an economic zone of 200 miles from the coast. Within this 
economic zone many different combinations o:r coastal state 
control are possible. These varying possibilities offer the 
flexibility that is required for the necessary compromises 
among nations before an agree!)lent can .be reached. 
The second issue for discussion is the question of 
exact coastal state control over their territorial and 
economic waters. This topic pal'tially assumes the outcome 
of the first issue of national jurisdiction. In other words, 
everyone is expecting coastal claims to expand, probably to 
a distance of 200 miles, but what type of control inside 
\>Ihich distances has become critical. For example, different 
distances may well be claimed only for speciric resources 
the coastal state wishes to protect. For oi1 ill the con-
tinental shelf a relatively narrow band would suffice, to 
protect fishing rights a broader limit ap~roa.ching 200 miles 
·seems adequate. While to lay claim to manganese nodules 
:;;::;;--~ ----_ ----~--~ 
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beyond the continental margin even greater distances would be 
required. In addition to the problems presented by ocean 
resources, which have already been discussed at length, other 
uses of the sea further complicate the issue under examination. 
One of the most illusive problems related to addi-
tional uses of the sea is that of military use which includes 
spying. While clearly a motivating factor to the major 
industrialized states, military uses of the ocean as a reason 
to form ocean policy can hardly be persuasive to the world 
community particularly in light of the rhetoric surrounding 
international ocean debate. Almost all references to this 
topic carry the phrase "peaceful uses of the ocean •••• " As 
a result maritime powers have been insisting that"other 
legitimate uses 11 of the ocean be recognized within the wider 
coastal state boundaries. Such ambiguity adds an atmosphere 
of uncertainty·to the question of traditional military 
operations in coastal state waters. 
Also related to military use of the oceans but of 
vital concern to commercial interests as well is the question 
of international straits which would become "closed" by a 
12-mile territorial sea. With a 12-mile limit most straits 
in the world, with a vJidth of 24-miles or less, would become 
territorial waters and therefore subject to additional 
coastal state controls. The United States, Soviet Union, 
United ru.ngdom and other major developed states are highly 
concerned about any additional control over international 
straits. On the other hand, several other states point to 
the doctr1.ne of innocent passage and maintain that the new 
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limit will not cause B. hindrance to free transit through 
formally international straits. 
The use of ocean space for scientific research has 
recently become a very controversial and political issue. 
\Vhile major developed states, mostly those sponsoring the 
oceanographic research, point to the traditional concepts of 
freedom of the sea and freedom of scientific research, many 
developing states are demanding a change. Angered by 
developed states' abuse of the freedom of scientific research 
principle (the Pueblo incident, for examplel<t developing 
states are beginning to question the principle 1 s legi tirnacy o 
They argue that the information gained by oceanographic 
research only benefits developed nations often at the expense 
of the have-not countries. 
A final problem related to the present issue of 
juris diet ional ·control is the que.stion of pollution and it s 
prevention. Some countries are suggesting that coastal 
states be given the complete responsibility for the creation 
of pollution standards. Other states are opting for inter-
national standards. Similarly, some nations favor coastal 
state enforcement of pollution standards, while others suggest 
that this function should be performed by an international 
body. 
The eventual agreements made at the Conference 
related to the jurisdLctional controls of coastal states are 
difficult to predict. However, several things seem probable. 
Exact military uses of the sea are likely _ _:!:;o be dealt with' by 
not dealing with them.a.t all or by some vague reference to 
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"other legitimate uses" upon wh1.ch maritime powers will 
derive their justification for military operations. Although 
most international straits will probably become territorial 
straits due to the 12-mile limit, there will almost certainly 
be a guarantee of free passage with minimal coastal state 
restrictions. On scientific uses developing states are 
likely to hold their ground demanding and probably getting, 
an agreement for coastal state permission and possibly even 
participat1.on before oceanographic expeditions are permitted 
near their coasts. '11he pollution question is not likely to 
be given much attention or consideration unless it becomes the 
means to a compromise on other, mor•e deeply felt, issues. 
What kind of regime will the Conference on the Law of 
the Sea establish?.' An even more fundamental question is, will 
any be established? These questions have received consider~ 
able attention ·since 1967. Almost everyone agrees that a 
regime should be established, almost no one agrees on what 
kind. Basically there are four different categories of 
powers and functions which the regime could ass,xme. _They are 
gathering information, registration of ocean activities, 
licensing ocean activities, and direct exploitation of sea 
resources. 
There have been a number of draft proposals submitted 
by various nations to "establish an international oceari 
regime beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." The 
wording above demonstrates the importance that issue number 
one on national jurisdiction has in relation to the regime. 
Obviously, if the regime functions only beyond the limits of 
,_, 
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national jurisdiction and those 11.mits are s:et at approxi-
mately 200 miles from shore there will be little for a Tegime 
to do. This reality ~aises the question of the possibility 
of some regime control \vi thin coastal economic zones 1 as 
suggested in the United States draft. Additional questions 
related to the regime concern what form it will take and what 
role it wili play in the settlement of dispu~tes. 
The final-outcome at the Conference 'on the regime 
question will depend heavily on current need f'or certain 
ocean resources as well as their exploitabilityo It seems 
likely that the regime will be given the registration and 
licensing powers described in Chapter VII. However, it's 
sphere of control will probably be outside of the coastal 
state economic zones. As a result the only :resources of 
consequence that the regime may have some control over will 
be the manganese nodules of the ocean floor.. Even this 
possibility is tenuous •. If commercial exploitation of 
nodules begins before a firm agreement is reached at the 
Conference~the whole idea of a regime could be scuttled. 
Such an occurrence would indeed be disastrous since the 
possibilities of conflict over rights to nodules would be 
greatly increased. At the very least the regime must provide 
an international forum to mitigate conflict over ocean wealth 
and provide for settlement of disputes. Seyom Brown in a 
recent article has underscored the importance of providing a 
mechanism for the settlement of disputes. 
Finally, procedures for settling disputes take 
on special importance in today's ocean diplomacy 
si.mply because the continuing pro11.feratlon of 
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ocean activities portends more disputes among more 
countries over more issues than ever before. 
•. • • The United States, not normally a friend of 
compulsory international jurisdiction, anticipates 
circumstances in which its nationals, especially lts 
oil drillers and shippers, may be threatened by 
unilaterally imposed coastal-state restrictions. 
American negotiators now say that acceptance of 
compulsory jurisdiction is the cornerstone of new 
arrangements being considered, and that most of 
their own proposals for future ocean policy would 
be absolutely unacceptable without compulsory 
jL1risdiction. Thus the impression is conveyed that 
compulsory jurisdictiop, like free transit, is a 
non-negotiable demand.4 -
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The fourth issue before the Conference is one raised 
by the ideological phrase that the oceans and their wealth 
are the ucommon heritage"· of all mankind. Arvid Pardo, the 
Ambassador from Malta, used this phrase in his now famous 
declaration before the General Assembly. 
It is, therefore, considered that the time has 
come to declare the sea-bed and the ocean floor a 
common heritage of mankind and that immediate steps 
should be taken to draft a treaty embgdying, .,!~ 
~~~ the following principles~ • • • . 
The r-9.thev obvious implication of common heritage is that 
nations should peacefully share in ocean uses and resources • 
. The question on this issue is whether or not such talk is 
real or rhetorical~ There have been several draft proposals 
submitted by various states that provide for a method of 
redistribution of ocee.n resources to those developing nations 
\'Jho do not possess the ca.pabili ties to exploit the oceans 
themselves. The principle of common heritage has been 
universally accepted by the member nations of the United 
4srown, p. 313. 
5 . . 
Padelford, p~ 290 
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Nations. 
This author feels, however, that the ideological 
principle of' common heritage wlll have little meaning at the 
bargaining table of the upcoming Conference. The developed 
nations have already voiced their objections to 11misinter-
preta.tions" of the common heritage idea. For example, John 
Stevenson of the United States delegation to the Sea-bed 
Con~ittee has stated: 
• • • the position taken by some delegations t-Ji th 
which we have consistently disagreed, that 11 commo~ 
heritage" means the "common property 19 of mankind. 
Although common heritage has become pa1 .. t of nearly every 
draft proposal its meaning is as slippery as the interstate 
co~nerce clause of the United States Constitution. John 
Frohnmayer has noted: 
' Stirring I•hetoric such as "the Seas are the 
heritage of all mankind" is being recognized as meaning 
whatever the country using it desires it to mean. 
Since the current W1Certainty of the law of the sea-bed 
:favors the developed countries with technology and 
capital, underdeveloped nations have chosen a state-
mate as preferable to continued lack of controls. 
If a plan of redistribution comes from June 1 s Conference, it 
l-Jill probably be token in nature rather than a genuine attempt 
to practice a philosophy o:f common heritage. A more signifi-
cant question is, what amount of tokenism, if any, will the 
developing nations accept? How stubbornly will they stick to 
their demands? These questions strike at the heart of the 
next and final issue~ 
6 Th~_pepartment of State Bulletin, LXVII, p. 384. 
7 -Frohnmayer, p. 604. 
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The final issue for discussion is that of the 
Conference's impact upon the growing international struggle 
between North,,and Sou-th. The upcoming Conference of the LavJ 
of the Sea has in many respects given focus to increasing 
tensions betvwen the have and the have ... not nations. Seyom 
Brown has corn..rnented:: 
The ocean bargaini~g now underway features and 
reinforces some of the patterns of international poli-
tics emerging in the world at large. We 8.re referring 
pa.rticularly to the disintegration of the cold-vJa.r 
coalitions, the relative rlse of non-securlty issues, 
the diversification of friendship and e..dversa.ry .. 
·relations, and the embitterlng8tension betHeen the have and the have-not peoples. 
Ocean debate, culminating in this year's Conference, 
is a major and direct confrontation of the Hor·th-South 
struggle. The Conference's real significance _will be more in 
the patterns of behavior est·ablished between North and South 
than in the specific allocat.ion of ocean resources. \-rhat 
principles will characterize this struggle? Compromise? 
National self-interest? It may not be logical to assume that 
the same modes of behavior that he.ve characterized the East" 
West conflict will also apply to a new North-South confron-
tation. There is considerable evidence that developing 
nations, at least on the sea regime issue, may not be willing 
to·· compromise for something less than what they want, even 
though the result of their stubbornness will hurt them far 
more than the developed countries. Such irrational behavior 
undermines' traditional concepts of national-self interest. 
8 Bro\o1n, p. 313. 
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Another important facto~ in the opposition between 
the have and have-not nations is the role that the People's 
Republic of China will play. Already working hard to 
establish itself as the leader of the Third World, China may 
well emerge from the Conference as the bastion of hope for 
the developing countries. 
The developed·nations may be paying a higher price 
£or ocean resoLtrces than they have figured.. If the 
industrialized states divide oc·ean w~alth among themselves, 
excluding the developing countries, the result may be an 
embittered era in international relations--a new era with new 
divisions and alliances. playing an old game of polarization 
and confl1.ct. 
Man is'a unique ani~al. He has the intellectual 
capacity to substantially alter his envirorunent. However, it 
has become questionable l-1hether he can also adapt to the 
environment that he has himself transformedo Wolfgang 
Friedmann has expressed this concern inhis book The Future 
··=-·-~ 
of the Oceans:: 
-· 
The tragedy of mankind may prove to be the inability 
to adapt its modes of behavior to the products of its 
intellect. Twentieth~century man threatens to be a 
new kind of dinosaur, an animal ~uffering from a brain 
ill-adjusted to its environmento'7 
9Friedmann, p. 120. 
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APPENDIX A 
PETROLEUM 
r= 
--------------
WORLD PROVED RESERVES (IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)* 
* Harry Ji1er et a1., ed. Comm9.dity Year Book _ _;197,l 
(New York: Commodity Research Bureau, Inc., 1973), p. 257 o 
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APPENDIX. B 
PRIMARY METAL TO BE RECOVERED FROM NODULES TO 
. . . * EXTENT OF TOTAL WORLD PRODUCTION IN 1967 
Percentage of 1967 world production 
Pounds o~ associated metals that would be 
per ton made available simultaneously 
of 
Metal 1967 world productlo:g_ ~~~--~__godules Manganes~~ _Q_Qpper Nickel Cobalt 
Manganese 18,650,000 short tons ore 
11,184,377,000 pounds 
1,007,943,000 pounds 
100(%) 
2,502 
169 
. 4{%}. 59(%) 4.53(%) 
1:~479 11,33.5 Copper 
Nickel 
Cobalt 32, 89 0, 000 po U..."lds 
15 
20 
5· 22 
100 
8 
.9 
100 
13 
766 
100 
* . Elaine H. Burnell and Piers von Simson, (eds.) Pacem in Maribus (Santa Barbara: 
Fund for the Republic, Inc., 1970), Pe 3o 
:['i 
,f 
lfTIJ:I 1·: 11::,: II 
I 
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}-1 
0 
()::) 
...,.-___ _.__....___.~..... .............................. ____ ----~~-~ ...... _ ..... _ ...... 
APPENDIX C 
TONS OF NODULES . AND B01'TOM AREAS TO BE HARVESTED 
EACH YEAR TO YIELD METALS AT THE 1967 
LEVEL OF PRODUC'riON FROM LAND SOURCES~} 
Pounds Short Fraction of 
per ton tons of Area to be total deep 
of nodules harvested ocean bottom 
Metal 1967 world production Nodules required sq. miles area 
l"ianganese 
Copper 
Nickel 
Cobalt 
18,650,000 short tons ore 
11,184,377,000 pounds 
1,007,943,000 pounds 
32,890,000 pounds 
15 
20 
5 
29,8001000 
745,625,100 
50,397,150 
6,578,000 
1,069 
26,746 
1,808 
236 
0.0008(%) 
0.0192 
0.0013 
0.00017 
*Elaine H. Burnell and Piers von Simson, (eds.) Pacem in Maribus (Santa Barbara: 
Fund for the Republic, Inc., 1970), p. 3· 
1 : r; :! 1 ·~ :1. , n · 1 •• , I ILl 
' II 
II, 
I-' 
0 
-.() 
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APPENDIX D 
VALUE OF WORLD PRODUCTION OF NODUT~ METALS AT 1972 PRICES* 
METAL 1972 PRODUCTION MARKET PRI.CE VALUE 
Manganese 22,42.5, 000 short ton.s $30.00 per ton·· $. 672,7.50,000 
: .. : 
Copper 14,200,000,000 pounds .52 per pound 7~384,000,000 
Nickel 1,417,000,000 pounds $ 1.40 per pound. 1,983,800~000 
Cobalt 52,900,000 pounds $ 2.45 per pound 129,605,000 
T O'rAL VALUE $10' 170, 1_5_5:, 000 
* ,. Harry Jiler e~ al., ed. Commodity Year Book 197l (New York: Commodity 
Research Bureau, Inc., 1973), p. 251. 
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